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MICHAEL T. MORLEY* 
ABSTRACT 
 There are a variety of procedural vehicles through which litigants may seek a substan-
tive court ruling or order that declares or modifies their legal rights and obligations without 
actually litigating the merits of a case as a whole or particular issues within the case. These 
alternatives include defaults, failures to oppose motions for summary judgment, waivers 
and forfeitures, stipulations of law, confessions of error, and consent decrees. Courts pres-
ently apply different standards in determining whether to accept or allow litigants to take 
advantage of each of these vehicles for avoiding adversarial adjudication. Because all of 
these procedural alternatives share the same underlying structural similarity, however, 
courts should apply a single, consistent, unified standard to all of them. 
 Article III’s prohibition on hypothetical suits places outer bounds on the range of false 
factual and legal premises on which a court may base a judgment. Courts should go beyond 
this constitutional minimum, however, and apply an accuracy-centric approach in deciding 
whether to issue requested relief when litigants inadvertently or deliberately, expressly or 
implicitly, seek to have the court avoid considering the merits of a claim, issue, or argument 
in a case. If the court—based on its background knowledge of the law, experience with simi-
lar cases, or independent legal research—harbors doubts about the validity of a litigant’s 
legal premises or contentions, or believes the parties have overlooked a potentially valid 
claim, issue, or argument, it should decline to grant the requested relief and direct the liti-
gants to brief the matter.  
 Adopting an accuracy-centric approach helps courts perform not only their law-
declaring function of expounding the law and generating accurate precedents, but            
their dispute-resolution function, as well. Litigants, the public, and courts themselves     
have a strong interest in having courts resolve cases, and issues in cases, in accordance  
with the substance of applicable law, even when they are acting primarily in a dispute-
resolution capacity. 
  
 * Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Special thanks to 
Richard Fallon, Jack Goldsmith, John Goldberg, Daniel Meltzer, and Susannah Barton 
Tobin, as well as the participants in the Climenko workshop for their questions and     
comments. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 How wrong may a court be? Or, to be more precise, how indifferent 
to being correct is a court permitted, or even required, to be? There 
are a variety of procedural vehicles through which litigants may seek 
a substantive court ruling or order that declares or modifies their le-
gal rights and obligations without actually litigating the merits of a 
case as a whole, or particular issues within the case. These alterna-
tives include defaults, failures to oppose motions for summary judg-
ment, waivers and forfeitures, stipulations of law, confessions of er-
ror, and consent decrees.1  
 Depending on the particular procedural vehicle employed, liti-
gants may act deliberately or inadvertently,2 expressly or implicitly. 
All of these alternatives, however, allow litigants to obtain substan-
tive court orders (i.e., not just dismissals3) while avoiding adversarial 
adjudication of their cases or particular issues within their cases. 
When litigants invoke one of these procedural vehicles, courts are 
faced with a stark choice. They may either adjudicate issues and cas-
 1. See infra Part II.  
 2. Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 252-53 
(2004) (“[P]arties may simply fail to see all of the possible arguments relevant to the issues 
they have raised, or they may have tactical or strategic reasons for arguing an issue in a 
particular way that omits relevant legal arguments.”).  
 3. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1994) (recog-
nizing that a dismissal for lack of justiciability is essentially a housekeeping order).  
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es correctly, regardless of the particular arguments or claims the par-
ties raise, or instead allow the parties expressly or implicitly to agree 
to incorrect factual and legal premises and adjudicate cases on their 
terms, focusing primarily or solely on claims, issues, and arguments 
that the parties themselves choose to assert.   
 The Supreme Court has failed to answer this question in a con-
sistent manner. Despite its repeated insistence that courts should 
generally consider non-jurisdictional issues only if raised by the par-
ties,4 it has decided many important—even landmark—cases based 
on issues the parties never raised or affirmatively disputed.5  
 This Article explores the extent to which litigants may, expressly 
or implicitly, through their acts or omissions, induce courts to enter 
substantive rulings and judgments that declare or change their legal 
rights and obligations, while failing to consider fully the merits of one 
or more of the legal issues involved. I contend that when a litigant 
seeks a substantive court ruling or order while attempting to avoid 
adversarial adjudication of a case or particular issues within a case, 
the court should ensure that the litigant’s legal premises are correct, 
regardless of the procedural vehicle the litigant uses. If a court—
based on its background knowledge of the law, experience with simi-
lar cases, or independent legal research—harbors doubts about the 
validity of a litigant’s legal premises or contentions, or believes the 
parties have overlooked a potentially valid claim, issue, or argument, 
it should decline to grant the requested relief and direct the litigants 
to brief the matter.   
 Part II begins by offering a descriptive overview of current doc-
trine. Surprisingly, under current law, a litigant’s ability to obtain a 
substantive ruling or order while avoiding adversarial adjudication of 
either specific issues or the case as a whole turns primarily on the 
procedural vehicle the litigant uses. That is, whether a court is per-
mitted to reach the merits of a legal issue, as well as the degree of 
scrutiny the court may or must apply, depends on whether the court 
is faced with a default, failure to oppose a summary judgment mo-
 4. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“In our adversary system, in 
both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of 
party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and as-
sign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”); United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 390 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that, except in “excep-
tional cases,” the “Court will not consider issues not raised by the parties” (citation omit-
ted)); see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972) (“There is no reason for the 
Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case. . . . The State has at no 
point tried this case on th[at] theory . . . .”).  
 5. Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte 
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 254-59 (2002); Barry A. Miller, Sua 
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity To Be Heard, 
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1288-96 (2002). 
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tion, waiver, forfeiture, stipulation of law, confession of error, or con-
sent decree. This Part explores the dramatically varying legal stand-
ards that apply to each of these procedural alternatives. It devotes 
special attention to the previously overlooked evolution of the Court’s 
standards for reviewing confessions of error, which has run the gam-
ut from full-merits review to virtually unquestioning acceptance.  
 Part III briefly distinguishes these vehicles for avoiding adversar-
ial adjudication from settlement agreements, which are private con-
tracts that do not result in either substantive court rulings that re-
solve legal issues or judgments that declare or modify the litigants’ 
respective legal rights and obligations.   
 Part IV then turns to this Article’s central prescriptive claims. 
Courts should apply a single, uniform standard whenever litigants 
deliberately or inadvertently seek to avoid adversarial adjudication of 
a case or issues within a case. The standard should be accuracy-
centric, allowing courts to identify and invite the litigants to address 
claims, issues, and arguments that appear to be pertinent, in order to 
ensure that the court’s rulings and judgments are based on the appli-
cable law to the greatest extent possible. This Part begins by demon-
strating that Article III’s prohibition on hypothetical suits places 
outer bounds on the range of false factual and legal premises on 
which a court may base a judgment. It goes on to explore the various 
reasons why courts should go well beyond this floor of constitutional-
ly required accuracy by acting affirmatively to ensure the accuracy of 
their rulings and adjudications. It concludes by looking at the unique 
issues that arise in the context of issue creation by appellate courts.  
 Part V addresses the major objections to this Article’s proposed ac-
curacy-centric approach to adjudication, and Part VI briefly concludes.  
II.   PROCEDURAL VEHICLES FOR AVOIDING                                                  
ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION 
 Litigants may implicitly or explicitly consent to have a court re-
solve a case, or particular issues within a case, without adversarial 
testing in a variety of ways, including: defaults, failures to oppose 
motions for summary judgment, waivers and forfeitures (including 
failures to raise timely objections or potentially meritorious argu-
ments in response to most types of motions), stipulations of law, con-
fessions of error, and consent decrees. This Part examines the sur-
prisingly unrecognized and potentially troubling disparities that ex-
ist among the standards that courts apply when faced with these var-
ious alternatives for offering legal concessions.  
2014]  AVOIDING ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION 295 
 
A.   Defaults 
 A court may enter a judgment imposing legal obligations on a de-
fendant, enjoining certain conduct, or declaring the litigants’ respec-
tive rights without adversarial adjudication of the underlying legal 
issues if the defendant fails to enter an appearance and respond to a 
complaint. Typically, a court will treat a party’s failure to enter an 
appearance or file a responsive pleading6 as a default7 and deem the 
complaint’s well-pled factual allegations admitted.8 When such de-
faults occur, the court still must assess the validity of the complaint’s 
allegations of law9 and determine whether the plaintiff has stated 
valid causes of action.10 Likewise, if the plaintiff seeks injunctive re-
lief, the court must exercise its equitable discretion and decide for 
itself whether the requested relief is appropriate.11  
 The burdens on the plaintiff are even higher when a federal agen-
cy or official defaults, extending to factual issues as well.12 Under 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12.  
 7. Id. at R. 55(a).   
 8. Id. at R. 8(b)(6); see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 
114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who defaults 
thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (quoting 
Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004))); Angelo 
Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715, 722 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 9. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“[A] defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit con-
clusions of law.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 10. Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that, even if a de-
fendant is in default, a court is “required to determine whether the [complaint’s] allega-
tions establish [the defendant’s] liability as a matter of law”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 
F.3d 847, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 11. 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 65.03 (3d ed. 2013) 
(“[A] plaintiff is not entitled to a permanent injunction simply because a default judgment 
has been entered; the court must engage in an ‘inquiry’ to determine whether the plaintiff 
has demonstrated that injunctive relief is appropriate.”); see also Thomson v. Wooster, 114 
U.S. 104, 113 (1885) (“[A] decree pro confesso is not a decree as of course according to the 
prayer of the bill . . . [but] is made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is 
proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill assumed to be true.”).  
 12. A complete default by a government official or entity is rare and most often the 
product of inadvertence, backlog, or lack of agency personnel. See, e.g., Alameda v. Sec’y of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1046 (1st Cir. 1980). Sometimes, the Department 
of Justice will decline to defend the constitutionality of a law, but it typically will notify the 
court (and Congress) of its intentions, rather than completely defaulting in the underlying 
case. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013) (“The Department of 
Justice has submitted many [28 U.S.C.] § 530D letters over the years refusing to defend 
laws it deems unconstitutional . . . .”). Numerous scholars have debated whether the execu-
tive branch may validly attempt to avoid adversarial adjudication of constitutional issues 
in this manner. Compare Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to 
Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 510 (2012) (“There is no plausible argument that the Con-
stitution obliges the President to press constitutional claims that he finds unpersuasive or 
objectionable . . . .”), Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal–
Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (2012) (“[T]he Executive Branch should not 
defend challenged statutes when it . . . has questions about the statute’s constitutionali-
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d), “A default judgment may be 
entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if 
the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that 
satisfies the court.”13 As one court explained, “[T]he natural intend-
ment of this language is that, after entry of default against the gov-
ernment, the quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a 
court can be less than that normally required.”14 Courts nevertheless 
apply Rule 55(d)’s evidentiary requirements vigorously,15 refusing to 
enter a default judgment against the Government unless the plaintiff 
has established entitlement to relief on the merits.16  
 Thus, before entering a default, the court must engage in a full 
merits review of the legal issues involved in the case—even in the 
absence of adversarial presentation. Likewise, if the plaintiff has re-
quested equitable relief, the court must exercise its independent dis-
cretionary judgment as to whether to grant it. When the defaulting 
defendant is a government agency or official, the court’s obligation to 
confirm the validity of the plaintiff’s claims are even greater.   
B.   Failures to Oppose Summary Judgment Motions 
 A court also may issue a substantive ruling in a case without ad-
versarial adjudication of the underlying legal issues if a party fails to 
oppose a motion for summary judgment. In general, when a party 
ty.”), and Dalena Marcott, Note, The Duty to Defend: What Is In the Best Interests of the 
World’s Most Powerful Client?, 92 GEO. L.J. 1309, 1321 (2004) (arguing that the President’s 
oath and the Take Care Clause prevent him from defending the constitutionality of stat-
utes that he believes to be unconstitutional), with Charles Fried, The Solicitor General’s 
Office, Tradition, and Conviction, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 549, 550 (2012) (arguing that the 
Executive should defend the constitutionality of federal laws “unless no colorable argument 
can be made in their defense or unless they trench on prerogatives of the executive 
branch”), and Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1183, 1235 (2012) (“[T]he executive branch should enforce and defend statutes such as 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and DOMA—even when it views them as wrongheaded, discriminato-
ry, and indeed as shameful denials of equal protection.”). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d).  
 14. Alameda, 622 F.2d at 1048. The court went on to caution, “[I]f the district court 
and we have been put in the predicament of flying on one wing”—that is, deciding a case 
without adversarial presentation of the issues due to governmental intransigence—“the 
flight need not be lengthy.” Id. at 1049. 
 15. See, e.g., Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that, because the plaintiff “did not provide satisfactory expert evidence to establish his 
claims, he is not entitled to default judgment”); Camacho-Rodriguez v. Potter, 136 F. App’x 
378, 379 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming judgment for Postmaster General of the 
United States, despite his default, because plaintiffs “failed to establish an ADA viola-
tion”); United States v. Jacobs, No. 93-3795, 1994 WL 667008, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 
1994).  
 16. See, e.g., Marziliano v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming default 
judgment against the Secretary of Health and Human Services because “we have no reason 
to believe that the requirements of Rule 55(e) were not satisfied”).  
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does not respond to a motion, the matter is deemed conceded.17 
Summary judgment, however, “cannot be granted by default even if 
there is a complete failure to respond to the motion.”18 If a litigant 
fails to oppose a motion for summary judgment, the court must de-
cide for itself whether the moving party’s claims or defenses are le-
gally valid and the evidentiary record entitles it to judgment.19 Cir-
cuit courts will vacate judgments that are based solely on a litigant’s 
failure to oppose a summary judgment motion and are not supported 
by any legal or factual analysis.20   
 Interestingly, this is a stricter standard than courts apply to com-
plete defaults. As discussed above, when a private defendant fails to 
respond to a complaint, the court will accept the complaint’s well-
pled factual allegations as true and review only the legal sufficiency 
of the plaintiff’s claims.21 If a defendant has entered an appearance 
and filed a responsive pleading but fails to oppose a motion for sum-
mary judgment, however, the court not only must satisfy the re-
quirements for entering a default judgment, but must go a step fur-
ther and ensure that the plaintiff has introduced at least some ad-
missible evidence to support its material factual allegations. This 
most closely resembles the standard that courts apply to defaults in 
cases against government entities.22   
 It is not clear why a court should apply a higher standard for issu-
ing a judgment when a defendant fails to oppose a motion for sum-
mary judgment than when the defendant completely fails to respond 
to a complaint.23 If anything, one could imagine that the standard for 
 17. See, e.g., Hershey v. United States, No. 89-15262, 1991 WL 80326, at *2-3 (9th Cir. 
May 16, 1991).  
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note subdiv. (e) (2010); see also Henry v. 
Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A local rule that requires the entry of 
summary judgment simply because no papers opposing the motion are filed or served . . . 
would be inconsistent with Rule 56, [and] hence impermissible . . . .”).  
 19. See, e.g., Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1–800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 
2004) (“[T]he failure to oppose a motion for summary judgment alone does not justify the 
granting of summary judgment. Instead, the district court must still assess whether the 
moving party has fulfilled its burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.”); United States v. One 
Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere 
fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Patterson v. City of Utica, 514 F. App’x 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacating 
grant of an unopposed motion for summary judgment because “the district court provided 
no reasons or citations to evidence in the record to justify dismissing [the plaintiff’s] 
claims”). 
 21. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.  
 22. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.  
 23. It could be argued that the heightened standard is a type of “reward” for partici-
pating in the litigation process up until the point of summary judgment. Courts’ willing-
ness to hold that litigants who have actively litigated a case have waived or forfeited poten-
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granting a default would be higher than for granting an unopposed 
summary judgment motion. Even a properly served defendant24 
might inadvertently overlook a complaint or not fully understand its 
legal significance; when the defendant is an entity, the complaint 
might get lost in the bureaucracy, be misrouted internally,25 or never 
be brought to the attention of the proper officials. A defendant who 
has litigated a case through the summary judgment stage, in con-
trast, indisputably is aware of the case and what is at stake. Indeed, 
a defendant who has engaged in discovery often will have a much 
more accurate conception of the nature, strength, and validity of the 
plaintiff’s claims than at the outset of a case, immediately after being 
served with a complaint. Thus, the heightened standard that applies 
to unopposed summary judgment motions is somewhat puzzling.  
 Regardless, as is the case with default judgments, in order to 
grant an unopposed summary judgment motion, whether for the 
plaintiff or the defendant, a court is required to engage in a full mer-
its review of the legal issues involved in the case and must at least 
consider the record evidence. 
C.   Waivers and Forfeitures 
 When a defendant enters an appearance in a lawsuit, files a re-
sponsive pleading, and opposes the plaintiff’s motions, the court gen-
erally is no longer required to identify for itself possible problems 
with the plaintiff’s causes of action or legal contentions. Rather, it 
becomes the defendant’s responsibility to identify legal deficiencies in 
the plaintiff’s claims,26 demonstrate the lack of evidentiary support 
for them,27 and assert affirmative defenses.28 Each litigant also is re-
sponsible for opposing motions its opponent may file, responding      
to the arguments contained in those motions,29 and presenting coun-
tially dispositive legal arguments largely undermines that interpretation, however. See 
infra Part II.C.  
 24. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
 25. See, e.g., Erin Geiger Smith, Pepsi Nailed with $1.26 Billion Judgment After Secre-
tary’s Mistake, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2009, 8:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
pepsi-nailed-with-126-billion-judgment-after-secretarys-mistake-2009-10.  
 26. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).  
 27. Id. R. 56(c)(1)-(2).  
 28. Id. R. 8(b)(1)(A), (c)(1).  
 29. See, e.g., Carr v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 13-11573, 2013 WL 5450291, at 
*3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2013) (“A party waives opposition to a motion if the party fails to 
respond to arguments raised in the motion.”); Chevchyan v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. ED CV 
13-1105 PA (OPx), 2013 WL 3819681, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s Opposi-
tion does not even address Defendants’ challenge to the viability of her FDCPA claim. 
Plaintiff has therefore waived any argument that the FDCPA claim can survive Defend-
ants’ Motion to Dismiss.”).  
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terarguments.30 Litigants likewise must ensure that the proceedings 
are conducted in accordance with the applicable rules by lodging 
timely objections.31  
 A court must consider and adjudicate any issues the litigants 
choose to raise or contest,32 but any arguments or objections that a 
litigant fails to assert in a timely manner are deemed waived or for-
feited. A forfeiture occurs when a party “fail[s] to make timely asser-
tion of the right” before the court,33 while a waiver occurs when a liti-
gant “ ‘intentional[ly] relinquish[es] or abandon[s]’ ” a claim, argument, 
or right,34 although the terms sometimes are used interchangeably.35  
 Courts generally are not required to consider waived or forfeited 
arguments, unless they concern the court’s subject-matter jurisdic-
tion36 or the justiciability of the case.37 Based on litigants’ waivers 
 30. See, e.g., Schneider v. Cont’l Serv. Group, Inc., No. 13-CV-5034 (JG) (MDG), 2013 
WL 6579609, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013) (“I will not consider [Defendant]’s statute-of 
limitations argument in deciding the instant motion. [Defendant] waived this argument for 
the purposes of the motion by failing to raise it in its opening brief.”); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. 
Knapp, No. 13 C 988, 2013 WL 3811613, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2013) (“In their reply 
brief, defendants argue that [plaintiff] is a ‘volunteer’ in payment and thus is not entitled 
to equitable subrogation. This argument is forfeited for purposes of the motion to dismiss, 
because defendants did not assert it in their opening brief . . . .”).  
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 46, 51(c) (requiring contemporaneous objections); see also FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 51(b) (same).  
 32. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and 
the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 172 (2005) (arguing that courts have a duty to be 
“weakly responsive” to the parties’ arguments, by “provid[ing] some form of response to” 
them and, if the court chooses to rule on some other basis, “explain[ing] why it believes [the 
litigants’ arguments] provide inappropriate grounds for resolution” of the case). The Su-
preme Court has stated that, depending on the nature of a legal issue, a court is not neces-
sarily required to provide a reasoned explanation for its ruling:  
The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, 
what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion re-
sponds to every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply 
writes the word “granted” or “denied” on the face of a motion while relying upon 
context and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear. The law 
leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own professional judgment.  
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). 
 33. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).  
 34. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 35. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004).  
 36. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kirkland (In re Kirkland), 600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be raised by a 
party, or by the court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.”); Athens Cmty. 
Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“It is axiomatic that subject 
matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and that courts may raise the issue sua sponte.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
 37. Flournoy v. Trust Co. of Columbus (In re Weaver), 632 F.2d 461, 462 n.6 (5th Cir. 
1980) (“Because standing is an element of the constitutional requirement of ‘case or contro-
versy,’ . . . objections to standing are never waived and must be raised by an appellate 
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and forfeitures, courts have adjudicated cases without first ascertain-
ing the standard of review that earlier decisionmakers should have 
applied,38 confirming the constitutionality of the statute to be         
applied39 or the validity of the regulations to be applied,40 deter-
mining whether the underlying statute creates a private right of   
action,41 assessing alternate constructions of key language in the   
underlying statutes42 or patents,43 examining potentially applicable 
affirmative defenses or exceptions to general rules that might       
have applied,44 or otherwise considering potentially meritorious or 
dispositive arguments.45  
court sua sponte.”); Singleton v. Eagleton, No. 2:12-cv-02339-GRA, 2013 WL 4436409, at *1 
n.2 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2013) (same for mootness).  
 38. See, e.g., Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 249 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Ap-
pellant] also argues for the first time in his reply brief that the [Board of Immigration Ap-
peals] improperly reviewed the immigration judge’s factual findings under a de novo 
standard of review rather than a clearly erroneous standard. . . . [W]e consider this argu-
ment waived because he failed to raise it in his opening brief.”); Goletz v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 383 F. App’x 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[Appellant] argues, for the first time on 
appeal, that the District Court should have applied a de novo standard of review because 
the language in the Plan does not make clear that [the ERISA plan administrator] has 
discretion. . . . ‘[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, an issue not raised in district court will 
not be heard on appeal.’ ” (citation omitted)). 
 39. See, e.g., Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 462 F. App’x 831, 834 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“We agree with the district court that [Plaintiff] waived any argument that the 
[challenged] Ordinances were facially unconstitutional either by themselves or in concert 
with [another Park City Ordinance,] § 4-3-16(C).”); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 241 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[W]e need not 
address this argument and, thus, the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 106(c), because [the 
debtor] failed to raise this issue below and, therefore, for purposes of this appeal, has 
waived it.”).  
 40. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279 (2001) (“We do not inquire here 
whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by § 602,” because the petition for certiorari 
raised only the issue of “whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the regulation.”).  
 41. See, e.g., TCG N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“[S]ince [Defendant] does not argue that there is no private cause of action, we need not 
reach the issue.”).  
 42. See, e.g., Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 223 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Since [Ap-
pellee] does not argue that the statutory concept differs from the common law concept, we 
need not consider them separately.”).  
 43. See, e.g., McDavid, Inc. v. Nike USA, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 
2012) (“[Defendant] does not present any arguments in support of its interpretation, how-
ever, so its argument for an alternative construction is waived.”); Info. Tech. Innovation, 
LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“Defendants have waived 
their right to present alternative constructions of the [patent’s] terms.”).  
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Galletti, 541 U.S. 114, 120 n.2 (2004) (finding that a 
taxpayer had forfeited the argument that the statute of limitations protects him from the 
IRS’s attempt to collect taxes, because the taxpayer “fail[ed] to raise it in the courts be-
low”); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116 n.2 (1998) (finding that State had waived its res 
judicata argument “by failing to raise it in its brief in opposition to the petition for certiora-
ri”); Gaither v. Ark. Found. for Med. Care, No. 4:11-CV-00576-KGB, 2013 WL 4496439, at 
*4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 20, 2013) (“[Plaintiff] does not argue for the application of any equitable 
doctrines. Accordingly, the Court need not consider these equitable doctrines.”).  
 45. See, e.g., Sundaram v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 39 F. App’x 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 
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 In Singleton v. Wulff, the Supreme Court explained that courts 
have discretion to address issues that litigants have not timely raised: 
 The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for 
the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the 
courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. 
We announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in 
which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not 
passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any 
doubt or where “injustice might otherwise result.”46 
 Some lower courts have described their power to consider waived 
or forfeited arguments as almost completely discretionary,47 while 
others will adjudicate such issues only when “necessary to avoid a 
manifest injustice.”48 Numerous commentators have pointed out that 
courts exercise this authority unpredictably, inconsistently, and 
based on unavoidably subjective preferences and priorities.49  
 Despite courts’ broad discretion to consider waived or forfeited is-
sues, a litigant wishing to bring such an issue to the court’s attention 
generally must show that the alleged problem constitutes “plain er-
ror.”50 In United States v. Olano, the Court established a four-factor 
test for plain error, explaining that “[t]here must be [i] an error [ii] 
that is plain and [iii] that affects substantial rights. Moreover . . . [iv] 
2002) (holding that each of the appellant’s claims either were “not meritorious” or “ha[d] 
been waived”); see also United States v. Proulx, No. 93-1269, 1994 WL 90636, at *2 (7th 
Cir. Mar. 22, 1994) (“Even if [Defendant]’s severance motion were meritorious, however, he 
has waived the issue.”); Kotoshirodo v. Brennan (In re Lull), No. 11-00349 SOM-BMK, 2011 
WL 6941487, at *6 (D. Haw. Dec. 30, 2011) (holding, in a dispute over whether a debtor 
made an avoidable preference, that “because the Trustee does not argue that [the recipient 
of funds from the debtor] is a nonstatutory insider, the court need not consider whether 
[that recipient] fits into this second category”).  
 46. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (citations omitted).  
 47. Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is 
within our discretion to consider an issue that the parties did not raise below.”).  
 48. See, e.g., In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]e may exercise discretion to consider waived arguments where necessary to avoid a 
manifest injustice . . . .”); cf. Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (exercising 
“discretionary power to address issues that have been waived” because “failing to consider 
[Appellant]’s arguments would result in the substantial injustice of deporting an American 
citizen”).  
 49. Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 463-64 (2009) (“[J]udges 
have not articulated a clear set of conditions that lead them to deviate from their typical 
practice of letting the parties frame the dispute. . . . The absence of principled guidelines 
governing judicial issue creation has led some to accuse judges of raising new issues when 
doing so accords with their personal preferences.”); Robert J. Martineau, Considering New 
Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1024 
(1987) (“[I]t is almost impossible to predict in a particular case whether or not the appel-
late court will consider a new issue raised by the appellant.”); Miller, supra note 5, at 1287 
(“[A]part from questions of jurisdiction, courts are more likely to raise an issue sua sponte 
if they think a case is really important or if the judges really want to reach a particular 
result.”). 
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); FED. R. EVID. 103.  
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the error [must] seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”51 This burden is exceptionally dif-
ficult to meet in civil cases.52  
 Thus, under most circumstances, a court has discretion to consider 
a non-jurisdictional issue or argument that a litigant waives or for-
feits, but it is not required to do so. 
D.   Stipulations of Law 
 Stipulations of law are yet another vehicle litigants may use to 
obtain a substantive court ruling or judgment without contesting the 
merits of one or more legal issues involved in the case. A litigant may 
enter into a stipulation of law expressly by filing a written agreement 
signed by the opposing parties,53 embracing an opponent’s legal as-
sertions in its own filings,54 or making a concession at oral argu-
ment.55 A litigant also may effectively enter into an implicit stipula-
tion by failing to contest an opponent’s legal assertion or argument, 
such as where a litigant does not challenge its opponent’s assumption 
that the law of a particular jurisdiction applies. There may not be a 
firm distinction between an implicit stipulation and a forfeiture; if a 
litigant fails to contest one of its opponent’s legal arguments, the liti-
gant can be said to have either forfeited its right to oppose that ar-
gument or implicitly stipulated to it.  
 The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that courts 
are required to confirm the accuracy of stipulations of law before ac-
cepting them or necessarily must reject inaccurate ones. In United 
States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of 
America, Inc., the parties disputed the proper meaning of 12 U.S.C. 
 51. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
 52. See, e.g., Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 253 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In most civil 
cases, plain error review is unavailable; if a party fails to object at trial, the issue cannot be 
raised on appeal.”).  
 53. See, e.g., Rosario v. United States, 824 F. Supp. 268, 276 n.19 (D. Mass. 1993) 
(“The parties filed with the Court a Joint Stipulation of Rulings of Law . . . in which they 
agreed to the application of certain legal principles.”); Mather v. Northfield Freezing Sys. 
(In re S. Star Foods, Inc.), 202 B.R. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (“On October 15, 
1996, the parties filed their ‘Agreed Stipulations of Law and Fact’ . . . .”).  
 54. See, e.g., Frank v. Frithiof (In re James), 463 B.R. 719, 727 n.13 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2011) (“In their briefs, the parties stipulate that the law of Pennsylvania should govern the 
resolution of this matter.”); Inter-Am. Ins. Co. v. Ketchum, No. 89 C 1753, 1989 WL 88382, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1989) (“In their briefs on [Defendant]’s motion, however, the parties 
refer solely to Illinois law. For purposes of this motion this court will treat this as a stipu-
lation that Illinois law governs this dispute.”).  
 55. In re Bomb Disaster at Roseville, 438 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (discuss-
ing the parties’ stipulation at oral argument that the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A 
set forth the standard for strict liability in the case).  
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§ 92.56 None of them, however, contested § 92’s continued existence 
and enforceability at any point in the proceedings, offering “what in 
effect was a stipulation on a question of law” on that issue.57 The D.C. 
Circuit sua sponte held that § 92 was no longer enforceable because 
Congress had repealed it several decades earlier.58 Explaining that 
“courts ‘are not bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to 
questions of law,’ ”59 the D.C. Circuit concluded that courts “not only 
have the right to inquire into [the statute’s] validity . . . [but] have 
the duty to do so.”60 
 The Supreme Court declined to endorse this reasoning.61 Although 
it agreed that the D.C. Circuit had the power to consider § 92’s      
continued existence and enforceability, the Court was careful to 
frame the issue as an exercise of discretion rather than obligation.    
It explained: 
[T]he Court of Appeals acted without any impropriety in refusing 
to accept what in effect was a stipulation on a question of law. We 
need not decide whether the Court of Appeals had, as it concluded, 
a “duty” to address the status of section 92 (which would imply er-
ror in declining to do so), for the court’s decision to consider the is-
sue was certainly no abuse of its discretion.62 
 The Supreme Court’s decision to recede from the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding by concluding that courts have the discretionary power to 
review stipulations of law, rather than a mandatory duty to do so, 
leaves important aspects of the standard governing such stipulations 
unaddressed. There does not appear to be any case law explaining 
when it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to accept a stipu-
lation of law. Typically, a court “by definition abuses its discretion 
when it makes an error of law.”63 If this meant that it would be an 
abuse of discretion to accept an erroneous stipulation of law, whether 
explicit or implicit, then a court would have to review and assess the 
validity of all such stipulations. Because the Supreme Court rejected 
the D.C. Circuit’s imposition of such a duty, it is unclear what, if any, 
affirmative obligation a court has to identify and reject invalid stipu-
lations of law. 
 56. 508 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1993).  
 57. Id. at 448.  
 58. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev’d 
sub nom. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. 439.  
 59. Id. at 733 (quoting Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939)). 
 60. Id. at 734.  
 61. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 508 U.S. at 448. 
 62. Id. (citation omitted).  
 63. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996).  
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 Thus, a court has discretion to consider the merits of a stipulation 
of law, and apparently may do so sua sponte, regardless of the liti-
gants’ wishes.64 A court generally is not required to confirm the accu-
racy of a stipulation before accepting it, however, unless it relates to 
subject-matter jurisdiction or justiciability.65  
E.   Confessions of Error 
 Confessions of error—which typically, though not always, are of-
fered by government entities—are yet another method of obtaining a 
substantive court ruling or judgment while avoiding adversarial ad-
judication of particular issues. A confession of error acknowledges 
that a lower court’s opinion or judgment contains a defect or error 
that requires a higher court, usually the Supreme Court, to reverse 
or vacate it, and most often to remand the case for further proceed-
ings.66 As then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr explained, the Gov-
ernment confesses error “if on reflection, we believe that we were 
wrong in the lower courts.”67   
 The Supreme Court has changed its position several times con-
cerning both whether it will review the merits of the underlying legal 
issue before accepting a confession of error, as well as the preceden-
tial effect of a ruling based on a confession of error. Indeed, these 
questions continue to spark controversy among the Justices. Alt-
hough there are no sharp dividing lines and some exceptions exist, 
the Court’s case law concerning confessions of error can be divided 
into three main epochs. 
 1.   The Early Years (1890s–1942) 
 The earliest reported Supreme Court cases involving confessions 
of error from the Government, dating from the end of the nineteenth 
century through the early 1940s, accept them as a matter of course. 
Following a confession of error, the Court would reverse the lower 
court’s ruling and typically remand for further proceedings, without 
considering either the merits of the case or the substance of the con-
fession.68 These rulings almost always stated tersely, “Judgment re-
 64. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917) (“[T]he court 
cannot be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law.”).   
 65. As mentioned earlier, different rules apply to jurisdictional issues. See supra notes 
36-37.  
 66. Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. 
REV. 73, 78 (1995). 
 67. Edward N. Beiser, Kenneth W. Starr & Gerhard A. Gesell, Remarks, Perspectives 
on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 484-85 (1990).  
 68. See Sherwin v. United States, 312 U.S. 654, 654 (1941) (per curiam); Loveland v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 665, 665 (1929); United States ex rel. Fink v. Tod, 267 U.S. 571, 
571 (1925); Albers v. United States, 256 U.S. 706, 706 (1921); Kornmann v. United States, 
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versed, upon confession of error by the defendant in error [i.e., the 
United States], and cause remanded,”69 often with directions to set a 
new trial.  
 These rulings do not suggest that the Court’s decision to accept a 
proffered confession of error either was discretionary or involved con-
sideration of its merits, and there do not appear to be any examples 
during this half-century period of the Court rejecting one. Due to the 
brevity of nearly all of these rulings, there was no reasoning to act as 
a holding or precedent in future cases. Of course, as a practical mat-
ter, a confession of error locked in the Government’s position on re-
mand, resolving how the underlying legal question would be ad-
dressed throughout future proceedings in the case.  
 Goodrich v. Edwards70 was one of the only cases from this era in 
which the Court traversed a confession of error, considered the mer-
its of the issue, and established a precedent. In Goodrich, the Gov-
ernment confessed error regarding the lower court’s interpretation of 
a tax law concerning the date to be used in determining the cost basis 
of personal property.71 When the case reached the Supreme Court, 
the Government agreed with the taxpayer that his tax assessment 
had been erroneously high.72 After noting the confession of error, the 
Court went on to analyze and interpret the statutory text for itself, 
ultimately “agree[ing] with the Solicitor General” concerning the 
proper method for calculating cost basis under the statute at issue.73  
 A few years later, when faced with a related tax issue in United 
States v. Flannery, the Court emphasized that Goodrich represented 
the Court’s independent interpretation of the statute, despite the 
248 U.S. 594, 594 (1918); Overton v. United States, 239 U.S. 658, 658 (1915); Gilland v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 709, 709 (1911) (per curiam); Stearns v. Youngworth, 209 U.S. 552, 
552 (1908); De Baca v. United States, 189 U.S. 505, 505 (1903); Kettenring v. United 
States, 168 U.S. 703, 703 (1897); Hohenstein v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 776, 776 (1893); Ballin v. 
Magone, 140 U.S. 670, 670 (1891); Metro. Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 
L. Ed. 1011, 1012 (1878). These cases are a representative sample to show the continuity of 
the Court’s approach throughout this era; a complete list would be many times as long.  
 69. Luckey v. United States, 163 U.S. 692, 692 (1896). It appears that, in many of 
these early cases, the Government confessed error by filing a motion in the Court to re-
verse and remand. See, e.g., Sherwin, 312 U.S. at 654 (“On the Government’s confession of 
error, its motion to reverse is granted.”); Loveland, 278 U.S. at 665 (noting that the ruling 
was “on motion of Solicitor General Mitchell for the United States” (emphasis omitted)). 
 70. 255 U.S. 527 (1921).  
 71. Id. at 534-35.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 535; see also Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 805, 
805 (1930) (per curiam) (“On inspection of the record . . . and the confession of error by the 
Government . . . it is ordered that the judgment be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and 
the cause is remanded . . . with instruction to dismiss . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. appears to be the first case in which the Court declared 
that it examined the record before accepting a confession of error.   
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Government’s confession of error.74 The appellant in Flannery argued 
that the Court should not apply Goodrich as binding precedent, since 
it was based on a confession of error.75 Rejecting that argument, the 
Court explained that Goodrich “was not based on the confession of 
error,” but rather “embodied the reasoned judgment of the court.”76 
Goodrich was an outlier ahead of its time;77 the far more common 
practice prior to the 1940s was for the Court to simply reverse based 
on the confession of error without considering the merits or establish-
ing a precedent.  
 2.   The Young Era (1942–1970s) 
 The Court’s first sustained discussion of the consequences of a 
confession of error came in 1942 in Young v. United States,78 well 
over a half-century after its first express acceptance of one.79 The So-
licitor General conceded that a statute requiring vendors of certain 
drugs, “including dispensing physicians,” to keep records did not ap-
ply to physicians who personally administered the drugs to patients 
they were treating.80 The Court stated: 
[A confession of error] does not relieve this Court of the perfor-
mance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of the law 
enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is 
entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to 
examine independently the errors confessed. . . . [O]ur judgments 
are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law 
cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.81 
 74. United States v. Flannery, 268 U.S. 98, 103-04 (1925).  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Toward the end of the Early Years, when the Solicitor General admitted there was 
a problem with the lower court’s ruling but declined to formally confess error, the Court 
followed the Goodrich approach of independently examining, and ruling on the merits of, 
the underlying legal issue before reversing and vacating the lower court’s ruling. See John-
son & Higgins of Cal. v. United States, 287 U.S. 459, 461 (1932) (engaging in independent 
determination of whether the petitioner had properly been hired by the Government where 
the Solicitor General did not “formally confess[] error,” but admitted that “the proper of-
ficer of the Government was authorized to employ petitioner”); Taylor v. United States, 286 
U.S. 1, 5 (1932) (engaging in independent determination of whether a search was unconsti-
tutional when the Solicitor General “prefer[ed] not to enter a confession of error,” but ad-
mitted that “the entry by the agents was wrongful and the search and seizure unreasona-
ble”); Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 508 (1931) (considering whether the plaintiff 
was entitled to interest from the Government when “[t]he Government, without formally 
confessing error, state[d] its belief that interest should have been allowed”).  
 78. 315 U.S. 257 (1942).  
 79. See Metro. Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 L. Ed. 1011 (1878). 
 80. Young, 315 U.S. at 258-59.  
 81. Id. (citation omitted). 
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It then parsed the language of the provision at issue, including the 
meaning of the term “dispensing physicians;” reviewed other sections 
of the statute; and discussed its legislative history before concluding 
that the statute did not apply to the petitioner.82 The Court reversed 
his conviction, consistent with the Government’s confession of error.83  
 Young was the Court’s first express recognition that it was not 
bound by a confession of error and instead was required to review the 
underlying legal issue for itself before accepting a confession. Under 
this approach, a ruling based on a confession of error was a holding of 
the Court on the merits of the issue, just as if the parties had contin-
ued to dispute it. Neither Young, nor the cases that followed in the 
decades immediately afterward, recognized the potential Article III 
concerns that this approach raised. The Court often overruled lower 
courts, issued precedential rulings without adversarial presentation 
of the main legal issues, and adjudicated appeals despite the appar-
ent absence of any controversy between the parties on the issue pur-
portedly being appealed.84 
 In the decades following Young, the Court largely abandoned its 
earlier practice of automatically reversing when the Government con-
fessed error without considering the underlying issue. Rather, the 
Court would acknowledge the confession of error but go on to either 
engage in a detailed analysis of the issue, as if the Government had 
not made a confession,85 or instead state that it was reversing based 
on both the “confession of error and the record.”86 As Justice Douglas 
 82. Id. at 259-61. 
 83. Id. at 261. 
 84. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (per curiam) (holding that 
“the ‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated [is] a safeguard 
essential to the integrity of the judicial process” and is “indispensable to adjudication of 
constitutional questions by this Court” (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Well-
man, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892))); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“That 
judicial power, as we have seen, is the right to determine actual controversies arising be-
tween adverse litigants.”).   
 85. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 237-39 (1968); 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228-30 (1954); Gordon v. United States, 347 U.S. 
909, 909-10 (1954) (per curiam); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1953); Gibson v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 338, 344-50 (1946); Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79, 80-90 (1945); 
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (per curiam).  
 86. Fogel v. United States, 335 U.S. 865, 865 (1948) (per curiam); see, e.g., Penner v. 
United States, 399 U.S. 522, 522 (1970) (per curiam); Rogers v. United States, 376 U.S. 
188, 188 (1964) (per curiam); Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716, 716 (1961) (per curi-
am); Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958) (per curiam); Lightfoot v. United 
States, 355 U.S. 2, 2 (1957) (per curiam); Jost v. United States, 347 U.S. 901, 901 (1954) 
(per curiam); Shelton v. United States, 346 U.S. 270, 270 (1953); Chiarella v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 946, 946 (1951) (per curiam); see also Cruz v. Colorado, 368 U.S. 4, 4 
(1961) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding the lower court judgment based on “consid-
eration of the entire record and the confession of error of the Attorney General of Colora-
do”); Nicholson v. Boles, 375 U.S. 25, 25 (1963) (per curiam) (same with confession of error 
from West Virginia Attorney General); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 562 (1947) (per cu-
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explained, the Court would mention its examination of the record to 
underscore the fact that it was not “blind[ly] accept[ing] . . . confes-
sion[s] of error.”87 Several of these cases also reiterated Young’s ad-
monition that the Court was obligated to traverse a confession of er-
ror and consider the merits of the issue for itself.88  
 In one case, the Court was even more explicit, stating that the 
lower courts had “accepted the Government’s argument as then made 
and, if they were right in doing so, we should affirm.”89 Thus, the 
Court expressly contemplated rejecting confessions of errors that it 
concluded were erroneous.90 Even after Young, however, there were a 
handful of outlier rulings in which the Court accepted a confession   
of error without either engaging in a merits analysis or indicating 
that it was basing its ruling on the record,91 but those were the rare      
riam) (accepting a confession of error from the Illinois Attorney General on a state-law 
issue and concluding that the petitioner “was denied the due process of law which the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires”). 
 87. Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 810 (1952) (per curiam) (Douglas, J.,      
dissenting).  
 88. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968) (“It is the uniform practice of this 
Court to conduct its own examination of the record in all cases where the Federal Govern-
ment or a State confesses that a conviction has been erroneously obtained.”); Orloff, 345 
U.S. at 87 (“This Court, of course, is not bound to accept the Government’s concession that 
the courts below erred on a question of law.”); Gibson, 329 U.S. at 344 n.9 (quoting Young 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1942)); see also Evola v. United States, 375 U.S. 32, 
33 n.* (1963) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Petite v. United States, 
361 U.S. 529, 533 (1960) (Brennan, J.).  
 89. Orloff, 345 U.S. at 87; see also Casey, 343 U.S. at 811-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“We sit in this case not to enforce the requests of the Department of Justice but to review 
the action of a lower court. . . . Once we accept a confession of error at face value and make 
it the controlling and decisive factor in our decision, we no longer administer a system of 
justice under a government of laws.”).  
 90. See, e.g., Weber v. United States, 119 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1941) (rejecting the 
Government’s confession of error because the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Govern-
ment’s contention that its successful argument in the lower court was erroneous), aff’d by 
an equally divided Court, 315 U.S. 787 (1942) (per curiam); see also David M. Rosenzweig, 
Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 
2081 (1994) (citing Weber). 
 91. See Gordon v. United States, 345 U.S. 968, 968 (1953) (per curiam) (“The judg-
ment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration in the 
light of the Government's confession of error.”); Bailey v. United States, 329 U.S. 670, 670 
(1946) (per curiam) (“The Court having given consideration to the Government’s confession 
of error, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Circuit Court 
of Appeals is reversed.”). One such exception is Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808, 808 
(1952) (per curiam), concerning the constitutionality of a search. The Court noted that ad-
judicating the matter would require it to resolve several questions of fact and law. Id. Ob-
serving that the Solicitor General had confessed error, the Court stated, “To accept in this 
case his confession of error would not involve the establishment of any precedent. Accord-
ingly we reverse the judgment as to all the petitioners.” Id.; see also Fortson v. Toombs, 379 
U.S. 621, 625 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that 
a confession of error may “reliev[e] th[e] Court of the necessity of making a definitive expo-
sition of its views” on the underlying legal issue).  
  Casey is remarkable because the Court acknowledged that it was accepting the 
confession of error without ascertaining the operative facts or the law and emphasized that 
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exceptions during this period.92   
 3.   The Modern/Chater Era (1970s–present) 
 A sharp dividing line does not exist between what I term the 
Young Era and the Modern/Chater Era,93 in which the Court has em-
braced a variation of the pre-Young approach. When the Solicitor 
General either makes an express confession of error94 or otherwise 
changes the Government’s position to argue that the lower court 
erred by ruling in the Government’s favor,95 the Court almost invari-
its ruling did not constitute binding precedent. 343 U.S. at 808. It is consistent with both 
pre-Young practice and more modern cases, but was a departure from the Court’s overall 
approach from 1942 to 1970. Indeed, Casey was such a departure from the Court’s estab-
lished practice in the Young Era that it drew a harsh dissent from Justices Douglas and 
Reed and Chief Justice Vinson. 343 U.S. at 810 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Unlike today’s 
per curiam, our recent per curiam orders and opinions have been careful to note that our 
reversal of a court of appeals judgment is based upon consideration of the record, not blind 
acceptance of a confession of error.”).  
 92. In cases where the Government confessed error, but an agency with independent 
litigating authority such as the Interstate Commerce Commission wished to defend the 
lower court’s decision, the Court would accept the confession of error but allow the other 
agency to take over the appeal. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 326 U.S. 
77, 81 n.2 (1945); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 69 (1944). The con-
fessions of error in those cases were not dispositive; the Court adjudicated the merits of the 
underlying issues based on the adversarial presentations of the independent agency and 
the private litigant. 
 93. This Article uses the label “Modern/Chater Era” because, although the Court’s 
ruling in Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1996) (per curiam), articulates and 
forcefully defends the Court’s most recent (and still current) doctrine, the Court actually 
started applying that new standard, instead of Young, in the early 1970s.  
 94. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 549 U.S. 1106, 1106 (2007); Rosales v. Bureau of 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 545 U.S. 1101, 1101 (2005); Saldano v. Texas, 530 
U.S. 1212, 1212 (2000).  
 95. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 553 U.S. 1029, 1029 (2008); Collier v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 1092, 1092 (2008); Duarte v. Mukasey, 552 U.S. 1036, 1036 (2007); Hohn 
v. United States, 537 U.S. 801, 801 (2002); Hoover v. United States, 519 U.S. 1052, 1052-53 
(1997); Polsby v. Shalala, 507 U.S. 1048, 1048 (1993); Williams v. United States, 500 U.S. 
901, 901 (1991); Chappell v. United States, 494 U.S. 1075, 1075 (1990); Gray v. United 
States, 484 U.S. 807, 807 (1987); Brown v. United States, 445 U.S. 922, 922 (1980); Singer 
v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 429 U.S. 1034, 1034 (1977); Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 
1006, 1006 (1972); Griffin v. United States, 402 U.S. 970, 970 (1971).  
  Occasionally, the Government agrees with the lower court’s ultimate judgment 
but argues that its reasoning was erroneous and that a remand is necessary to allow it to 
adopt an alternate, legally correct theory. See, e.g., Stephenson v. United States, 554 U.S. 
913, 913 (2008) (vacating and remanding case because the Solicitor General conceded that 
the lower court misinterpreted the defendant’s collateral-review waiver, even though the 
Government continued to maintain that the defendant’s conviction was valid); Nunez v. 
United States, 554 U.S. 911, 911 (2008) (same); Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 
545 (1990) (per curiam) (“If the judgment below rested on an improvident ground, as the 
Government suggests, the Court of Appeals should in the first instance pass on the ade-
quacy of the Government’s reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges.”); cf. John M. 
Murray, Note, Why the Supreme Court Should Stop GVR’ing the Solicitor General’s Ra-
tionale-Confessions-of-Error, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 879, 881 (2012) (“[W]hen the Solicitor 
General confesses error in a lower court’s rationale and asks the Court to GVR, the gov-
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ably “GVRs” the case: grants certiorari, vacates the lower court rul-
ing, and remands for reconsideration in light of the Government’s 
new position.  
 Crucially, under the modern approach, the Court does not “deter-
min[e] the[] merits” of a confession of error before taking action, but 
instead considers only whether it is “plausible.”96 Although the Court 
has never acknowledged it as such,97 this “plausibility” standard—
first articulated in 1996 in Lawrence v. Chater98—is an unavoidable 
repudiation of the jurisprudence of the Young Era. The earliest Mod-
ern/Chater Era cases from the early 1970s expressly state that the 
Court’s ruling “intimates no view as to the merits of the Solicitor 
General’s position”—a sharp contrast from the Young Era holdings 
discussed above.99 Although most subsequent rulings lack this ad-
monition, this qualification remains fairly implicit in them.  
 The Modern/Chater Era is also marked by discord among the Jus-
tices concerning the proper way to address confessions of error. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist100 and, later, Justice Scalia101—occasionally ac-
companied by a few other Justices—regularly dissented from GVRs 
based on confessions of error. They instead would have denied the 
petitions for certiorari and allowed the purportedly erroneous judg-
ments to either stand or be remedied by the circuit courts themselves.  
ernment may be motivated by litigation strategy rather than the fair and impartial admin-
istration of justice.”). 
 96. Chater, 516 U.S. at 171; see also Nunez, 554 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the Court’s “dubious yet well-entrenched habit of entering a GVR order without 
an independent examination of the merits when the Government, as respondent, confesses 
error in the judgment below”); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 407 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).  
 97. Cf. Chater, 516 U.S. at 182 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s current 
approach to confessions of error is “a relatively new practice” in comparison to how Young 
handled them).  
 98. Id. at 170-71 (majority opinion).  
 99. Crosslin v. Mtn. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004, 1004 (1971); Stanley v. 
United States, 400 U.S. 936, 936 (1970). 
 100. See, e.g., Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 198 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting); Malone v. United States, 484 U.S. 919, 919 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 
Scheer v. United States, 446 U.S. 932, 932 (1980) (Rehnquist & White, JJ., & Burger, C.J., 
dissenting); Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 449 U.S. 945, 945 (1980) (Rehnquist & White, JJ., & 
Burger, C.J., dissenting); Corley v. United States, 444 U.S. 806, 806 (1979) (Rehnquist & 
Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Rubin v. United States, 439 U.S. 810, 810 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Hammons v. United States, 439 U.S. 810, 810 (1978) (Rehnquist & White, JJ., 
& Burger, C.J., dissenting); Jackson v. United States, 434 U.S. 947, 947 (1977) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 451 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,        
dissenting).  
 101. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3461, 3461 (2010) (Scalia, Thom-
as & Alito, JJ., & Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Stephenson v. United States, 554 U.S. 913, 914 
(2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nunez, 554 U.S. at 911-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stutson, 
516 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chater, 516 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
                                                                                                                  
2014]  AVOIDING ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION 311 
 
 Then-Justice Rehnquist commented that the Court “should not[] 
respond in Pavlovian fashion to confessions of error by the Solicitor 
General.”102 He explained that it “ill behooves th[e] Court to defer to 
the Solicitor General’s suggestion that a Court of Appeals may have 
been in error after another representative of the Executive Branch 
and the Justice Department has persuaded the Court of Appeals to 
reach the result which it did.”103 He also argued that the “adver-
sar[ial] system of justice” is not “well served” by “routinely vacating 
judgments which the Solicitor General questions without any inde-
pendent examination of the merits” by the Court.104 
 The Justices’ different approaches toward confessions of error 
came to a head in 1996 in Lawrence v. Chater.105 The Solicitor Gen-
eral, confessing error before the Supreme Court, admitted that the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) should have determined the 
constitutionality of a state intestacy law before applying it to deny 
survivors’ benefits to a minor.106 Without conceding either that the 
state law at issue was unconstitutional or that the petitioner was en-
titled to benefits, the Solicitor General asked the Court to vacate the 
Fourth Circuit’s ruling and remand the case with directions to allow 
the SSA to resolve these issues in the first instance.107   
 The Court held, “[W]e have the power to issue a GVR order, 
and . . . such an order is an appropriate exercise of our discretionary 
certiorari jurisdiction.”108 Citing a range of cases going back to 1971 
(i.e., after the end of the Young Era), the Court stated, “We have 
GVR’d in light of . . . confessions of error or other positions newly 
taken by the Solicitor General . . . and state attorneys general.”109 
The Court further maintained that, unless a confession of error is 
part of “an unfair or manipulative litigation strategy,” GVR’ing a 
case based on a “plausible confession[] of error”110 “conserves the 
scarce resources of this Court”111 and “can improve the fairness and 
accuracy of judicial outcomes”112—an odd conclusion to draw about a 
 102. DeMarco, 415 U.S. at 451 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 103. Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405, 406-07 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 407; see also Alvarado v. United States, 497 U.S. 543, 545-46 (1990) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 940 (1991) (recog-
nizing that ruling on an issue despite a confession of error deprives the Court “of the bene-
fit of an adversary presentation”).  
 105. 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (per curiam).  
 106. Id. at 165. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 166. 
 109. Id. at 166-67 (internal citations omitted).  
 110. Id. at 171.  
 111. Id. at 168.   
 112. Id. 
                                                                                                                  
312  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:291 
 
process that does not allow the Court to consider the merits of the 
underlying legal issue.  
 Justice Scalia, in a lengthy dissent, challenged several aspects of 
the majority’s analysis. He recognized that GVR’ing cases based on 
the Solicitor General’s confessions of error, particularly “without de-
termining the merits,” was “a relatively new practice.”113 He echoed 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concerns about the deleterious effects of 
that practice on the adversarial process,114 although he ultimately 
conceded that it “is by now well entrenched.”115  
 As with the Court’s treatment of confessions of error in earlier 
eras, exceptions to the prevailing approach exist.116 Especially over 
the past few years, when a party has confessed error or otherwise 
refused to defend a particular position, the Court occasionally has 
appointed an amicus to advocate that view.117 And, on exceedingly 
rare occasions, the Court will reject a concession from the Solicitor 
General and adopt the opposite view.118 Nevertheless, the overwhelm-
ing majority of confession-of-error rulings demonstrate that the 
Young Era is over, and Chater represents the Court’s current ap-
proach.119 Thus, under current law, a court is required to accept a con-
fession of error that is “plausible,” regardless of its ultimate accuracy.   
 113. Id. at 182-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 114. Id. at 183.  
 115. Id. Justice Scalia further objected to the practice of GVR’ing “where the Solicitor 
General has not conceded error in the judgment below, but has merely acknowledged that 
the ground, or one of the grounds, on which the lower court relied was mistaken.” Id. (em-
phasis in original). He explained that the significance of a confession of error is extremely 
limited when the Government disagrees only with the lower court’s reasoning, rather than 
its ultimate judgment, because “we should not assume that a court of appeals has adopted 
a legal position only because the Government supported it.” Id. 
 116. See Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22 n.2 (1976) (per curiam) (adjudicating 
merits of hearsay issue and not “rely[ing] on the Government’s confession of error”); Rogers 
v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (examining the permissibility of ex parte communica-
tions between the judge and the jury in a criminal case, despite the Solicitor General’s 
apparent confession of error on the issue). 
 117. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239 (2011) (“Because the 
United States has confessed error in the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the first question, we 
appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment.”); Forney v. Apfel, 
524 U.S. 266, 268-69 (1998) (same); see also Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 
555 U.S. 438, 447 (2009) (adjudicating case because amici continued to defend the lower 
court’s position, which the respondents no longer wished to advocate). 
 118. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 940 (1991) (holding that the Fed-
eral Magistrates Act allows defendants to consent to having Magistrate Judges preside 
over jury selection in felony cases, despite the Solicitor General’s “conce[ssion] that it was 
error to make the reference to the Magistrate”). Peretz suggests that the Court may be 
willing to reject confessions of error when necessary to defend institutional interests of the 
judiciary that none of the litigants have reason to protect. In Peretz, the Court arguably 
was defending the judiciary’s interest in allowing Magistrate Judges to relieve district 
judges of the largely ministerial burden of jury selection, to allow district judges to spend 
their time on other, arguably more important judicial tasks.     
 119. See Shaun P. Martin, Gaming the GVR, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 561 (2004).  
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F.   Consent Decrees 
 Consent decrees are the final main procedural vehicle through 
which litigants can seek a substantive court ruling declaring or 
changing their legal rights and obligations, without having the court 
rule on the merits of a case.120 A consent decree is a court order that 
terminates a lawsuit and imposes obligations on one or both liti-
gants.121 It is enforceable through summary contempt proceedings 
before the court that issued it,122 rather than in a separate breach-of-
contract suit like a settlement agreement.123 A court may approve a 
consent decree among the litigants that agree to it, even if other par-
ties to the lawsuit, including intervenors, object.124  
 The Court has emphasized that a consent decree draws its force 
from “the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of the law 
upon which the complaint was originally based.”125 Thus, in deciding 
whether to approve a consent decree, the court does not determine 
whether “the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theo-
ries.”126 A court may enter a consent decree without finding that a 
statutory or constitutional violation has occurred,127 “inquir[ing] into 
the precise legal rights of the parties,” or “resolv[ing] the merits of 
the claims or controversy.”128 A court also may order broader relief 
 120. For a discussion of the justiciability problems with consent decrees, as well as the 
special separation-of-powers issues they raise when government entities enter into them, 
see Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Prob-
lems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forth-
coming 2014). Much of the explanation of consent decrees here is taken from that Article. 
Id.  
 121. Early Supreme Court cases reject the characterization of consent decrees as con-
tracts, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932), but later cases have 
acknowledged that such decrees are “hybrid[s]” of judgments and contracts, Local No. 93, 
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986). Because of their 
“dual character,” consent decrees “are treated as contracts for some purposes but not for 
others.” United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10, 238 (1975); see 
generally Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 
B.C. L. REV. 291 (1988) (arguing that a consent decree cannot be treated as either a tradi-
tional contract or a court order).  
 122. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 518.  
 123. See infra Part III.  
 124. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529 (holding that an intervenor “does not have power to 
block the decree merely by withholding its consent”); accord Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 
U.S. 567, 578-79 (1997).  
 125. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522. 
 126. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971).  
 127. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992); Armour & Co., 402 
U.S. at 682. 
 128. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see 
also Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 579 n.6. 
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than the plaintiffs originally sought in the complaint or than it could 
have ordered following an adversarial trial.129  
 In Local No. 93, International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land, the Court established four requirements for a consent decree to 
be approved.130 First, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction 
of the underlying dispute.131 Second, the decree must “ ‘come within 
the general scope of the case made by the pleadings.’ ”132 Third, the 
decree “must further the objectives of the law upon which the com-
plaint was based.”133 Finally, the decree cannot affirmatively require 
“unlawful” action,134 although in constitutional challenges the court 
sometimes will approve consent decrees that require or allow conduct 
that otherwise would be proscribed by the allegedly unconstitutional 
legal provision.  
 Courts apply different, and varying, standards when a govern-
ment entity attempts to enter into a consent decree declaring a stat-
ute or regulation unconstitutional or otherwise unenforceable. Many 
federal courts refuse to approve such consent decrees without first 
confirming for themselves that the challenged provision actually is 
unconstitutional.135 The D.C. Circuit, in contrast, has held that a con-
sent decree may override state law if either the district court deter-
mines that the plaintiffs prove the existence of a federal violation or 
the government defendants admit such a violation.136  
 129. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389; Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Franklin, 
989 F.2d 54, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1993); see, e.g., Nobels v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of Ga. (In re Consol. 
‘Non-Filing Ins.’ Fee Litig.), 431 F. App’x 835, 843 (11th Cir. 2011); Sansom Comm. v. 
Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1539 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing validity of consent decree containing 
terms which “far exceeded the relief available” under the federal statutes at issue).  
 130. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 
(1880)).  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 526.  
 135. Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating consent decree en-
joining enforcement of a state billboard law because “the district court could not supersede 
California’s law unless it conflicts with [a] federal law”); Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs 
of Chicago, 814 F.2d 332, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (“An alteration of the statutory scheme may 
not be based on consent alone; it depends on an exercise of federal power, which in turn 
depends on a violation of federal law.”); see also PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 116 
(3d Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s refusal to approve a consent decree barring en-
forcement of a state law restricting access to polling places because “the parties cannot 
circumvent valid state laws by way of a consent decree”); Large v. Fremont Cnty., Wyo., 
670 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st 
Cir. 1986). 
 136. Cleveland Cnty. Ass’n for Gov’t by the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 
142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that state law cannot “stand in the way” of a 
consent decree if it is remedying “an admitted or adjudged violation” of federal law).  
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 Some courts have gone even further, holding that a government 
defendant may enter into a consent decree or other settlement declar-
ing a legal provision to be unconstitutional so long as the plaintiff’s 
claim is “substantial.”137 Despite this diversity of approaches to con-
sent decrees that invalidate or circumvent state laws, courts do not 
generally take any precautions against consent decrees in which 
agencies agree to promulgate particular regulations; interpret, apply, 
or enforce statutes or other legal provisions in particular ways; or 
take other such actions.138 Thus, with the possible exception of con-
sent decrees with government defendants that would declare a legal 
provision unconstitutional or unenforceable, courts are generally re-
quired to approve consent decrees that satisfy Local No. 93’s relative-
ly lax four-prong test, without considering the merits of the underly-
ing legal issues in any further depth.  
 In conclusion, there are many procedural vehicles through which 
litigants may seek a substantive court ruling or judgment that modi-
fies or declares their legal rights and obligations, without adversarial 
litigation of either the case as a whole or certain issues within the 
case. The precise vehicle that litigants use determines whether the 
court is permitted or required to consider the merits of the underly-
ing legal issues and the degree of scrutiny it may or must apply to 
those issues.  
III.   SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND DISMISSALS 
 The various ways of avoiding adversarial adjudication examined 
in Part II differ materially from yet another alternative that is con-
spicuously absent from that discussion—settlement agreements. A 
settlement agreement is a private contract in which the settling liti-
gants agree to drop their claims, typically in exchange for money, a 
release from liability, or some other consideration. Because a settle-
 137. DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 966 A.2d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2009); see also Feeling v. 
Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 672-73 (D.D.C. 1994) (reaffirming the propriety of a consent decree 
that construed the federal statute governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
without assessing the validity of the plaintiffs’ allegations, based on considerations of “ju-
dicial economy, convenience, as well as fairness to the litigants”); Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 
36 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“[T]he Attorney General may settle a case 
which arises from a god [sic] faith federal challenge to a state law without admitting that 
the law violates federal law[,] [a]s long as there is sufficient evidence to show that the chal-
lenge to the state law is reasonable . . . .”); Summit Twp. Taxpayers Ass’n v. Summit Twp. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).  
 138. See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1579 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that, be-
cause the Secretary of Health and Human Services agreed to a consent decree which re-
quired “the promulgation of regulations, she cannot now object to th[ose] terms”); Citizens 
for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming consent 
decree “requir[ing] EPA to promulgate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge 
by 21 industries of 65 specified pollutants” and “mandat[ing] the use of certain scientific 
methodologies and decision-making criteria”).  
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ment agreement is a private contract, a litigant voluntarily may 
agree to provide more substantial relief than its opponent could have 
received in the underlying lawsuit. Settlement agreements differ 
from the other procedural vehicles discussed in Part II because, as 
purely private contracts, they do not result in substantive court or-
ders that declare or modify the litigants’ respective legal rights and 
obligations.139 The parties’ obligations toward each other are embod-
ied in the agreement itself, rather than a court order, and in most 
cases the court is not required to review or approve the agreement.140  
 As litigants generally may stipulate to dismiss a case without the 
court’s approval,141 a court has little or no opportunity to reject most 
settlements. Indeed, in most cases, the court may not even see the 
settlement agreement itself; additionally, many settlement agree-
ments contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit public disclosure 
of their terms.142 The resulting dismissal is recognized as a purely 
administrative housekeeping matter that does not reflect a judicial 
determination of the merits of the underlying suit.143 Thus, unlike the 
other procedural alternatives discussed in Part II, settlement agree-
ments allow a court to dispose of a case without issuing a substantive 
ruling, and generally do not lead to rulings, opinions, or judgments 
based on false, incorrect, or unexamined legal premises.  
 Owen Fiss famously argued that settlement agreements interfere 
with the primary role of a court,144 which he contends is not to resolve 
disputes among litigants, but rather “to explicate and give force to 
the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution 
and statutes.”145 A settlement, he argues, “deprive[s] a court of the 
 139. Elsewhere, I have explained why government defendants who wish to negotiate 
voluntary resolutions to lawsuits against them should be required to use settlement 
agreements, rather than consent decrees. Morley, supra note 120.   
 140. Courts must approve settlement agreements only in certain types of cases, such as 
class actions, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).  
 142. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality 
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 385-87 (1999); Erik S. Knutsen, 
Keeping Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 946, 950-51 (2010). 
 143. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1994). 
 144. Fiss also criticized settlements based on the possibility that litigants (particularly 
the poor) may be pressured into accepting unfair terms, the inability of organizations 
meaningfully to consent to them, and the difficulties they pose when disputes arise con-
cerning their implementation. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1076-85 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Against Settlement]. It is both conceptually and 
empirically debatable, however, whether settlements raise such concerns to a greater ex-
tent than adjudication, which is the only real alternative to them. See Samuel Issacharoff 
& Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1197-98 
(2009). 
 145. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 144, at 1085; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Su-
preme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) 
[hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]. 
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occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation” of 
the law.146 Because litigants negotiating a settlement are primarily 
pursuing their self-interest, “[t]here is no reason to believe that their 
bargained-for agreement is an instantiation of justice or will, as a 
general matter, lead to justice.”147    
 Litigants’ decision to enter into a settlement agreement in the 
midst of litigation does not seem to raise substantially greater con-
cerns, however, than if they avoided litigation altogether by resolving 
a dispute before a lawsuit is filed. In most cases, when parties settle 
a lawsuit, they could have entered into the same agreement at the 
outset of the case, or even before it was filed. Especially since parties 
generally have no obligation to bring a lawsuit in the first place, it is 
not clear that the court or the public have a strong interest in en-
couraging litigants who have reached a mutually agreeable solution 
to continue litigating for the sake of obtaining a ruling. Moreover, 
although a settlement may preclude the judiciary from interpreting 
the law on a given occasion, other lawsuits are likely to give the court 
 146. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 144, at 1085.  
 147. Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1277 (2009). The 
classical law-and-economics model of litigation presents a different, more favorable view of 
settlements, explaining that they permit litigants to achieve the expected results of a trial 
(and possibly appeal) without having to incur the transaction costs associated with full 
litigation on the merits. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984); see also Issacharoff & Klonoff, supra note 144, at 
1197-98. A settlement’s terms are generally based on the court’s expected ruling, taking 
into account not only the state of the law and the factual record, but the fact that courts—
including appellate courts—are unpredictable and sometimes err or reach otherwise unex-
pected conclusions. Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 21-22; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  
  Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, arguing forcefully in favor of settlements, con-
tends that parties who settle often can craft more effective remedies than the court could 
impose, because they are more knowledgeable about their circumstances and can agree to 
mutually preferable alternatives that the court itself could or would not order. Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settle-
ment Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 487 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Manda-
tory Settlement Conference] (“Solutions to disputes can be tailored to the parties’ polycen-
tric needs and can achieve greater party satisfaction and enforcement reliability because 
they are not binary, win/lose results.” (footnotes omitted)); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward 
Another View of the Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
754, 775, 795, 836 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Another View]; see also Margaret 
Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 
36-37 (1996).  
  Other scholars have argued that settlements are desirable because they are com-
promises that require give-and-take between the parties. Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto 
Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1009, 1013 (2008); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 968 
(2004). Instrumentally, a defendant may be more likely to adhere to a negotiated settle-
ment to which it voluntarily agreed than one imposed by the court. Lloyd C. Anderson, 
Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 
725, 727. 
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the opportunity to do so in the future—particularly for important or 
recurring issues. 
 Settlements also interfere with the main function of the judici-
ary—at least as Fiss conceives it148—to a far less degree than the vari-
ous procedural vehicles for avoiding adversarial adjudication identi-
fied in Part II. Although a settlement prevents the court from ex-
pounding the law or implementing public values in that case, it pro-
tects the court from issuing a ruling or judgment based on inaccurate 
or unexamined legal premises.149 At least as the rules of procedure 
currently treat them, settlement agreements provide a way of remov-
ing disputes from a court’s docket, rather than seeking judicial reso-
lution of them. Such agreements typically do not require the court 
implicitly or explicitly to put its imprimatur on unexamined and po-
tentially incorrect interpretations or applications of the law. Thus, 
rather than providing an additional means of avoiding adversarial 
adjudication, akin to those identified in Part II, settlement agree-
ments are meaningfully distinguishable from them.  
IV.   A NEW APPROACH TO AVOIDING ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION 
 Courts should adopt an accuracy-centric approach toward adjudi-
cation in which they take reasonable steps to attempt to ensure that 
their rulings and judgments are consistent with the law that governs 
the facts, claims, and issues before them. The various methods of 
avoiding adversarial adjudication identified in Part II all share the 
same fundamental structural similarity—they result in a court issu-
ing a substantive ruling or judgment (i.e., something more than a 
mere “housekeeping” dismissal150) without fully considering or accu-
rately resolving one or more of the underlying legal issues in the 
case. Courts nevertheless apply vastly different standards in deciding 
whether to accept, approve, or otherwise allow litigants to take ad-
vantage of each of those procedural alternatives. When a defendant 
defaults or a litigant fails to oppose a summary judgment motion, the 
court is required sua sponte to confirm the validity of the plaintiff’s 
legal theories.151 When a litigant waives or forfeits an issue or the 
parties offer a stipulation of law, the court generally has discretion to 
consider the issue, but is not required to do so unless the concession 
relates to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or the justiciability 
 148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  
 149. See generally Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 144 (explaining that a settle-
ment agreement prevents the court from articulating and applying public values in the 
underlying dispute).  
 150. Cf. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1994) (ex-
plaining that dismissal of a moot lawsuit is a “matter[] of judicial administration and prac-
tice” that does not involve determination of the “merits of a legal question”).  
 151. See supra Part II.A–B.  
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of the case.152 Conversely, when a prevailing party confesses error, 
the Supreme Court considers itself bound to accept the concession so 
long as it is “plausible.”153 Courts apply a similarly deferential stand-
ard toward proposed consent decrees, applying a very lax four-prong 
test that generally does not allow for consideration of the merits of 
the plaintiffs’ legal theories or the litigants’ concessions.154   
 Neither courts nor academic commentators have explained or de-
fended the broad range of divergent standards that apply to the vari-
ous procedural vehicles for avoiding adversarial adjudication. One 
main reason for the differences among these standards appears to be 
that courts generally consider each procedural alternative in isola-
tion, without recognizing or discussing its similarity to the others.155 
Because these procedural vehicles are fundamentally similar to each 
other, courts should apply a single, consistent standard in determin-
ing whether to allow or accept them. The ability of a court to base       
a ruling or judgment on an incorrect, incomplete, or simply un-
examined legal premise should not depend on the largely arbitrary 
contingency of the particular procedural vehicle through which it       
is presented.   
 If one accepts this Article’s fundamental argument that courts 
should apply a single, consistent standard to the different methods of 
avoiding adversarial adjudication, the question remains what that 
standard should be.156 In crafting a standard, it is necessary to de-
termine both the scope of a court’s latitude to consider or ignore legal 
questions relating to a case that the parties themselves have not ac-
tively contested, as well as the degree of scrutiny the court may (or 
must) apply when doing so. A court may be required to address legal 
issues or arguments the parties have overlooked or otherwise failed 
to contest, have complete discretion to decide for itself whether to ad-
dress them, or instead be strongly discouraged or even prohibited 
from doing so. When courts do consider such issues or arguments, 
they may be permitted to give those issues full de novo consideration, 
or instead be required to apply some lesser standard of scrutiny, such 
 152. See supra Part II.C–D.  
 153. See supra Part II.E.  
 154. See supra Part II.F.  
 155. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1996) (per curiam) (discussing 
confessions of error without considering other methods of avoiding adversarial adjudica-
tion); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1993) 
(same for stipulations of law); Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986) (same for consent decrees); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 
(1976) (same for waived and forfeited arguments). 
 156. Even if one disagrees that the same standard should apply to all of the procedural 
vehicles discussed in Part II, one still might be persuaded that this Article’s proposed accu-
racy-centric standard should apply to some of those alternatives, such as express stipula-
tions of law, confessions of error, or consent decrees. 
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as determining whether the parties’ position is “plausible”157 or satis-
fies some variation of the liberal four-factor standard governing    
consent decrees.158 
 Courts should adopt an accuracy-centric approach toward adjudi-
cation.159 When a litigant attempts to avoid adversarial adjudication 
of a case or issues within a case by affirmatively making an express 
submission to a court—such as by seeking a default judgment, filing 
a motion (whether or not dispositive), confessing error, submitting a 
stipulation of law, or moving for a consent decree—the court should 
decline to grant the requested relief if it harbors doubts about the 
accuracy or validity of the movant’s arguments or substantive enti-
tlement to relief. Rather, the court should invite the movant to file a 
brief addressing the court’s potential concerns and demonstrating the 
legal accuracy or validity of its arguments and the requested relief. 
The court likewise should permit any other interested litigants to 
present their views on the matter.160  
 157. Lawrence, 516 U.S. at 170-71.  
 158. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525-26.  
 159. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (stating that 
courts have the “independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of gov-
erning law,” rather than relying on the “particular legal theories advanced by the parties”); 
Cravens, supra note 2, at 251-52 (arguing that judges should exercise “their discretion to 
improve the law by implementing the most correct reasoning” in the matters before them); 
Frost, supra note 49, at 461-62, 516 (identifying a range of circumstances under which 
courts can examine new issues in order to avoid making “inaccurate or misleading state-
ments of law”); Oldfather, supra note 32, at 172 (explaining that a court must “come[] to 
terms with the parties’ dispute,” but “depart[] from the parties’ view of the dispute if they 
have mischaracterized its nature or overlooked some factor that is key to its resolution”); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 593 (1983) (“Given the 
importance of the courts’ expository role in the federal legislative process and of their role 
as the guardians and interpreters of fundamental rights, exposition rather than dispute 
resolution should be viewed as the primary function of the courts.”); see also Susan Bandes, 
The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 290 (1990) (“Once an issue is framed to the 
Court’s satisfaction, the presence of adverse parties becomes unimportant, whatever the 
stage of litigation, since the primary goal is to resolve the issue, not to settle a dispute be-
tween parties.”); William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel—The Trial 
Judge’s Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 639 (1980) (“When it appears in the course of litigation 
that a lawyer’s performance is falling short, it should be the trial judge’s responsibility, as 
the person responsible for the manner in which justice is administered in his court, to take 
appropriate action.”). Professors Michael Abramowicz’s and Thomas B. Colby’s creative 
proposal for notice-and-comment judicial decisionmaking, under which judges would post 
draft opinions on the Internet to solicit responses from members of the public, also is im-
plicitly based on the premise that judicial opinions should be as accurate as possible. See 
Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 1002 (2009).  
 160. Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 263 (arguing that sua sponte appellate court 
rulings violate due process because they “adversely impact the life, liberty, or property of a 
party without giving that party an opportunity to be heard on the issue that the court 
deems dispositive.”); Miller, supra note 5, at 1297 (“An appellate court should always ask 
for the parties’ submissions before ruling.”). But see Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 92 (1997) 
(declining to rule “that a court must always ask for further briefing when it disposes of a 
case on a basis not previously argued,” but holding that requesting supplemental briefing 
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 More broadly, if the court believes there may be a violation of a 
rule of procedure or evidence, it should alert the parties to the issue 
to request their views. And if the court identifies on its own an issue 
that directly bears on the case—such as a potentially meritorious 
cause of action or defense based on the pleadings or evidence before 
it—the court should bring it to the parties’ attention and give them 
the opportunity to litigate it, if they so choose.    
The rest of this Part elaborates on and defends these conclusions. 
Section A begins by discussing the Constitution’s restrictions on the 
extent to which a court may be indifferent to the legal accuracy of its 
rulings. It contends that Article III’s prohibition on hypothetical law-
suits, which limits a court’s ability to issue substantive judgments in 
cases based on faulty factual premises, should be extended to pre-
clude courts from entering judgments based on clearly incorrect legal 
premises as well. Section B explains that courts should go beyond 
this Article III minimum by adopting an accuracy-centric approach to 
adjudication. A court should issue rulings and judgments only if it 
believes that they rest on valid legal grounds, regardless of the pro-
cedural vehicle through which one or more litigants may deliberately 
or inadvertently attempt to avoid adversarial adjudication of an un-
derlying issue. Finally, because most of this discussion focuses pri-
marily on trial courts, Section C considers how these principles apply 
differently in appellate courts.  
A.   Article III Limits on Judicial Inaccuracy 
 Article III limits a court’s ability to adjudicate cases based on un-
examined, incorrect legal premises. It is well-established that courts 
must confirm their subject-matter jurisdiction, sua sponte if neces-
sary, and adjudicate any factual or legal issues relating to it.161 For 
example, if litigants attempt to stipulate that the amount-in-
controversy requirement for a diversity case in federal court is only 
$50,000 or try to maintain a diversity case despite the fact that one of 
the plaintiffs lives in the same state as one of the defendants,162      
the court would be obligated to raise the issue itself and dismiss      
the case.163 
 Article III likewise requires courts to confirm sua sponte that the 
cases and controversies before them are justiciable. Among other 
is “often fairer”); Cravens, supra note 2, at 294 (“[T]he process need not be unreasonably 
delayed by requirements for supplemental briefs or arguments.”).  
 161. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“When a requirement goes to sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties 
have disclaimed or have not presented. Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or 
forfeited.” (citations omitted)).  
 162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012).  
 163. See, e.g., Bialac v. Harsh Bldg. Co., 463 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).  
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things, Article III’s justiciability requirement prohibits courts from 
adjudicating “hypothetical” disputes.164 A dispute is hypothetical and 
non-justiciable if it is based on, or arises from, certain types of incor-
rect or false factual premises, regardless of whether the litigants 
themselves choose to dispute those facts.  
 For example, in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, the plaintiff sought to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of an Iowa law prohibiting the sale of al-
cohol under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.165 To 
state a valid claim for the deprivation of a property interest, the 
plaintiff had to show that he had owned the alcohol that he then 
wished to sell back when the challenged statute went into effect, 
which was several decades earlier in 1851.166  
 The plaintiff had alleged before the trial court that he had owned 
the liquor at issue before the law’s enactment, and the State never 
contested the allegation.167 The Supreme Court observed, “It is ab-
surd to suppose that the plaintiff, an ordinary retailer of drinks, 
could have proved, if required, that he had owned that particular 
glass of whiskey prior to the prohibitory liquor law of 1851.”168 It 
went on to hold that the State’s failure to challenge that allegation, 
“which carried on its face the strongest probability of its falsehood, 
satisfies us that a moot case was deliberately made up to raise       
the [issue of the law’s constitutionality] when the real facts of the 
case would not have done so.”169 Thus, the Court held that parties 
could not manufacture a justiciable case simply by stipulating to, or 
failing to contest, the underlying facts, at least where they seemed 
facially false.  
 164. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (distinguishing “[a] justi-
ciable controversy” from “a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character”); 
accord Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 57 (1976) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 
U.S. 288, 325 (1936); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 382 
(1992) (rejecting liberal justiciability standards that “would require federal courts to de-
termine the constitutionality of state laws in hypothetical situations”); Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 410 n.32 (1989) (“We do not address the hypothetical constitutional 
question whether, under the Compensation Clause of Article III, a district judge removed 
from the Commission must continue to be paid the higher salary.”). 
 165. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 132 (1873). 
 166. Id. at 132-34.  
 167. Id. at 134.  
 168. Id. at 135.  
 169. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R., 149 U.S. 
308, 314 (1893) (dismissing case as moot after the State acknowledged that the opposing 
party had paid the taxes at issue, because “[n]o stipulation of parties or counsel . . . can 
enlarge the power, or affect the duty,” of a court to avoid “decid[ing] moot questions or ab-
stract propositions” and to refrain from “declar[ing], for the government of future cases, 
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result . . . in the case before it”).  
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 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Swift & Co. v. Hocking 
Valley Railway Co.170 The Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) 
had issued an order authorizing railroads to charge additional fees 
for railroad cars that were left unloaded on railroad tracks for more 
than forty-eight hours, regardless of whether the railroads them-
selves owned the tracks. Pursuant to this order, the plaintiff railroad 
levied extra charges against the defendant meat packer for failing to 
unload its private cars within forty-eight hours after they arrived at 
their destination.171 The meat packer refused to pay, claiming that 
the ICC order and additional charges were unconstitutional as ap-
plied, because its car had been left on the meat packer’s private 
tracks.172 The meat packer maintained that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits the Government from allowing an entity to be charged fees 
for leaving a railroad car on tracks that the entity itself owns.  
 The railroad sued to recover the additional fees. At trial, the rail-
road and meat packer stipulated “that the track on which the cars in 
question were placed was the private track of [the meat packer].”173 
The Supreme Court held it was unnecessary to consider the meat 
packer’s constitutional claims because “the record discloses, contrary 
to the statement in the stipulation, that the track in question was not 
a ‘private track.’ ”174 Emphasizing that parties may not stipulate to, 
or avoid contesting, facts in order to obtain a judicial ruling, the 
Court “treat[ed] the stipulation . . . as a nullity.”175 Because the rail-
road company had actually owned the track on which the meat pack-
er had left its railroad cars, the Court concluded that the additional 
charges were reasonable and constitutionally permissible.176 
 This point was reaffirmed more recently in Poe v. Ullman, where 
the Court held that the plaintiffs could not challenge a state contra-
ception law because they did not face a credible fear of prosecution 
under it.177 Reaffirming that it was not bound by a plaintiff’s allega-
tions, a defendant’s admissions, or the parties’ stipulations,178 the 
Court held that the purported threat of prosecution in Poe “collides 
with plausibility.”179 Conversely, the Court has “encouraged” parties 
to conduct litigation “amicabl[y],” such as by “mutually admit[ting] 
facts which they know to be true, . . . without requiring proof,” in or-
 170. 243 U.S. 281 (1917).  
 171. Id. at 284.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 285.  
 174. Id. at 286 (emphasis omitted).  
 175. Id. at 289.  
 176. Id. at 290.  
 177. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 178. Id. at 501.  
 179. Id.  
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der to “bring the point in dispute before the court for decision, with-
out subjecting each other to unnecessary expense or delay.”180 The 
Court’s qualification is important—it does not extend to stipulations 
of inaccurate facts.   
 These cases collectively establish that courts are affirmatively re-
quired, at least to some extent, to traverse uncontested facts and 
stipulations to ensure that a justiciable dispute exists between the 
parties. Although these cases all involved constitutional challenges, 
the Court did not rely on any special canon of constitutional avoid-
ance, but rather general justiciability concerns that are equally ap-
plicable to non-constitutional cases.181 The duty to ensure the accura-
cy of the facts necessary for a case to be justiciable is triggered, at the 
very least, when litigants rely on “absurd”182 or “[im]plausib[le]”183 
contentions, or their allegations or stipulations are contrary to other 
evidence in the record.184  
 Although courts distinguish between “facts” and “law” in numer-
ous respects,185 it seems that, at least to some extent, the legal un-
derpinnings of a lawsuit also must be accurate for a justiciable dis-
pute to exist under Article III. If Article III requires courts to ensure 
that litigants do not deliberately or inadvertently manufacture a non-
justiciable, hypothetical controversy, it should not matter whether 
they do so by failing to contest a key fact that creates a need for judi-
cial intervention or an inaccurate legal premise. 
 Article III’s prohibition on hypothetical suits can have many im-
plications for legal issues that the parties do not contest. Most obvi-
ously, if litigants assume that a statute exists when in fact it has 
been repealed, any rulings the court makes concerning the statute 
would be purely hypothetical.186 The “law” at issue is not actually 
binding. Even if the litigants implicitly or expressly have consented 
to having their dispute adjudicated based on the non-existent statute, 
 180. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850) (emphasis added).  
 181. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preser-
vation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).  
 182. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 135 (1873).  
 183. Poe, 367 U.S. at 501.  
 184. California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1893). 
 185. The fact-law distinction is reflected, in part, in the differing roles of the judge and 
jury. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. Such a distinction also is reflected in the numerous 
ways that courts treat “adjudicative facts” differently from “legislative facts.” See FED. R. 
EVID. 201; cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Adminis-
trative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07 (1942). Of course, some commentators have 
challenged the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law. Ronald J. Allen 
& Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003); 
see also Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 867 (1992) (“Positive propo-
sitions about the law are a species of factual claims.”). 
 186. Cf. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447-48 
(1993).  
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the controversy would be just as hypothetical as if they agreed to 
have the matter adjudicated based on incorrect or false facts (such as 
a stipulation that a particular railroad track is “private,” rather than 
owned by a railway carrier187). 
 The same is true if litigants incorrectly interpret or apply a par-
ticular element of a legal provision or common-law cause of action, or 
otherwise fail to point out that a prerequisite or other requirement 
for relief has not been satisfied. For example, if a defendant neglects 
to recognize that the alleged duty in the plaintiff’s tort claim does not 
exist, it can lead the court to engage in unnecessary adjudication of 
other essentially hypothetical issues. The court would have to deter-
mine, assuming that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff—a 
duty that the law does not actually impose—whether the defendant 
breached that duty and what damages the plaintiff suffered as a re-
sult. A similar analysis would apply to the elements of a statute or 
regulation as well.  
 The Court has applied Article III’s prohibition on “hypothetical” 
suits somewhat narrowly, requiring courts to reject only facially im-
plausible or incredible facts, or facts that the evidentiary record es-
tablishes to be false, when the existence of a justiciable controversy 
depends upon them.188 There are several possible ways in which this 
standard could be applied to inaccurate legal premises upon which a 
case rests. For example, a court could be required to reject such a 
premise only if its invalidity would be deemed “plain” under the 
“plain error” standard in United States v. Olano.189 An error is “plain” 
if it is “clear,”190 “obvious or readily apparent,”191 and not “subject to 
reasonable dispute.”192  
 The “clearly established” standard from the qualified immunity 
context might be applied instead.193 A right is deemed “clearly estab-
lished” if any “reasonable official would understand that what he is 
doing violates [it].”194 “ ‘[E]xisting precedent must have placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ ”195 In applying 
this standard, the court must consider the issue “at the appropriate 
 187. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 285-86, 290 (1917).  
 188. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.  
 189. 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).  
 190. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.  
 191. Young, 470 U.S. at 17 n.14.  
 192. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).  
 193. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 194. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  
 195. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 
S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)).  
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level of specificity.”196 A right seldom will be deemed “clearly estab-
lished” based solely on “general proposition[s]” in earlier, factually 
distinguishable cases.197 Rather, there must be close factual similari-
ties between a precedent and a subsequent fact pattern.  
 Under either of these standards for applying Article III’s prohibi-
tion on hypothetical suits, a court would have a duty to ensure that 
litigants do not base a lawsuit on legal propositions that clearly and 
specifically have been rejected by binding precedents or that other-
wise are clearly inconsistent with such cases.   
B.   Accurate or Adversarial Adjudication? 
 Courts should go beyond the bare Article III minimum discussed 
above in Section A and adopt an accuracy-centric approach to adjudi-
cation by striving to ensure that legal issues in the cases before them 
are identified and resolved in accordance with the applicable law. At 
a minimum, a court should not accept litigants’ attempts to obtain 
substantive rulings and judgments while avoiding adversarial adju-
dication of a case or legal issues within a case. When a litigant seeks 
some form of relief from a court—such as by seeking a default judg-
ment, filing a motion, confessing error,198 submitting proposed stipu-
lations of law, or requesting judicial approval of a consent decree—
the court should not grant the request unless it is persuaded that the 
litigant is substantively entitled to it. Moreover, if the court identifies 
for itself a potentially meritorious legal issue, cause of action, or de-
fense arising from the “nucleus of operative fact”199 that the litigants 
have presented to it, the court should bring the issue to the parties’ 
attention and give them the opportunity to litigate it.   
 Judges can identify potential issues and concerns based on the 
standard research they typically conduct in connection with the cases 
before them, their general backgrounds as attorneys, and their expe-
rience with other, similar cases and issues.200 Under an accuracy-
 196. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40; 
cf. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (“[G]eneral statements of the law are 
not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning, and in other instances a general 
constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity 
to the specific conduct in question . . . .”).  
 197. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. 
 198. Strictly speaking, a confession of error may not, in itself, seek relief from a court, 
but such confessions typically arise in the context of requests that a lower court’s ruling be 
reversed and the case be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the litigant’s 
new position.  
 199. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).  
 200. Cf. Cravens, supra note 2, at 252 (“[P]ersonal experience, reflection, or research 
indicates to the judge that there is a better argument than any of those actually presented 
to the court by the parties.”). Cravens explains, “[T]he reality of judicial resources must 
preclude an absolute obligation on the part of appellate judges to ensure that all possible 
arguments or legal reasons have been presented.” Id. at 294.  
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centric approach, judges would not be required to perform extensive 
independent research or analysis, but also would no longer be per-
mitted to ignore significant issues that they naturally recognize in 
the course of adjudicating a case. Litigants that wish to exercise 
complete control over the contours of a case and retain the right to 
have it adjudicated according to their own premises—regardless of 
whether those premises actually correspond with the applicable 
law—are free to either seek private arbitration or negotiate their own 
private settlement agreement.201  
 To a layperson, the notion that courts should strive to ensure that 
their rulings and judgments are legally accurate likely would seem 
uncontroversial. The traditional conception of the American judicial 
process, however, is that litigants are entitled to shape their lawsuit 
and determine the issues the court should adjudicate. Under this 
view, judges must remain in a primarily passive role, addressing only 
questions that the litigants themselves have raised.202 Lon Fuller, for 
example, argued that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudica-
tion” is that each affected party may participate by “presenting proofs 
and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.”203 He explained 
that courts therefore should resolve lawsuits on the grounds present-
ed by the parties: 
[T]he bond of participation by the litigant is most secure when the 
arbiter rests his decision wholly on the proofs and argument actu-
ally presented to him by the parties. . . . [I]f the grounds for the de-
cision fall completely outside the framework of the argument, mak-
ing all that was discussed or proved at the hearing irrelevant—
then the adjudicative process has become a sham, for the parties’ 
participation in the decision has lost all meaning.204 
 Owen Fiss and Abram Chayes concur that, under the traditional 
model of adjudication, the judge is required “to stand as umpire or 
observer between the two disputants, relying on all their initiatives 
for the presentation of the facts and the law and the articulation of 
 201. See supra Part III.  
 202. See, e.g., Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The premise of 
our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal 
inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by 
the parties before them.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the 
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 412-13 (1978) (arguing 
that a court’s ruling generally “ought to proceed from and be congruent with [the parties’] 
proofs and arguments”); Frost, supra note 49, at 449 (discussing the traditional, party-
centric view of the judicial role).  
 203. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 
(1978).  
 204. Id. at 388.  
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the possible remedies.”205 As Gary Lawson contends, “If the parties 
agree on a proposition, that proposition simply is not in dispute, and 
it is far from obvious why a court should try to resolve it.”206 Indeed, 
Erwin Chemerinsky goes so far as to caution that raising issues that 
the parties themselves did not place in dispute puts courts “in the 
position of rendering unconstitutional advisory opinions.”207 
 Even for those who believe that the adversarial process is a criti-
cal, immutable feature of the American judicial system, there are 
numerous reasons why an accuracy-centric view of adjudication nev-
ertheless may be appealing. Most discussions of whether courts 
should raise and address issues that the litigants themselves have 
not identified frame the matter as a clash between a court’s responsi-
bility to declare the law (its “expository” role) and its duty to resolve 
disputes.208 Under this view, a court should transcend the specific 
issues and arguments raised by litigants in order to ensure that the 
precedents it creates are accurate209 and that it properly performs its 
fundamental constitutional role of “say[ing] what the law is.”210   
 These scholars are absolutely correct in emphasizing the need for 
courts to ensure the development of accurate precedents. In focusing 
on the judiciary’s role in law exposition, however, these arguments 
tend to minimize the proper performance of its dispute resolution 
 205. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 145, at 24; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of 
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1976).  
 206. Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1219 (2011). Lawson 
goes on to explain: 
If the parties hired a private arbitrator, they could specify as broad or narrow a 
function for that arbitrator as they wished, provided that they could agree on 
the scope of the case. To the extent that courts are, in essence, a form of com-
pulsory arbitration, there would seem to be a prima facie case for giving parties 
the same power, subject only to whatever constraints are imposed by the juris-
dictional limits of the relevant tribunal. 
Id. at 1221. 
 207. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court 
Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 302 (2000); see also 
id. at 304 n.61.  
 208. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 159, at 234; Chayes, supra note 205, at 1282-86; Sa-
rah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in 
Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1202-03 (2000); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra 
note 145, at 24-31; Frost, supra note 49, at 451-52; Oldfather, supra note 32, at 137-38; 
Spann, supra note 159, at 585-86.  
 209. Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions 
Not Properly Raised and Preserved—Part I, 7 WIS. L. REV. 91, 100 (1932); Frost, supra note 
49, at 453; Oldfather, supra note 32, at 131.  
 210. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Cravens, supra note 2, 
at 251-52 (arguing that courts “serve in some respects as trustees or custodians of the 
law”); Spann, supra note 159, at 593 (arguing that courts’ primary role is “exposition” of 
the law); cf. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 145, at 2-14 (arguing that the function of the 
judiciary is to give meaning to public values, particularly constitutional values).  
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role. Once a case has been brought before a court, the court would 
seem to have an inherent interest in ensuring that it is resolved ac-
curately, in conformance with the applicable substantive law. Be-
cause the judiciary is institutionally responsible for adjudicating cas-
es and controversies,211 it should not be indifferent to whether it is 
“doing justice as between the parties”212 by resolving their substan-
tive disputes accurately.  
 Court orders can have dramatic consequences. A judgment might 
require the payment of substantial amounts of money or extinguish a 
potentially lucrative cause of action. An injunction carries the possi-
bility of civil213 and criminal contempt,214 while a refusal to issue one 
allows a litigant’s conduct to continue unabated. And a criminal con-
viction often leads to imprisonment or other substantial restrictions 
on freedom, while an acquittal allows a potentially dangerous person 
to remain free. Courts have an important interest in ensuring that 
their awesome powers are applied under, and only under, legally ap-
propriate circumstances, even if litigants themselves make missteps 
in the course of judicial proceedings. 
 Courts also are warranted in focusing on the accuracy of their rul-
ings, rather than acceding to litigants’ deliberate or inadvertent at-
tempts to avoid accurate adversarial adjudication of certain issues, 
because a court’s ruling often will impact third parties beyond the 
litigants themselves.215 A court ruling can affect third parties both 
directly and indirectly, as well as through stare decisis. Even in pure-
ly private disputes, the imposition of substantial liability on a major 
company can limit the availability of certain goods or services to the 
public, lead to job losses or stagnant wages for innocent employees, 
and impact investors’ financial security. A large verdict against a 
smaller company can lead to bankruptcy, with reverberations felt by 
employees, creditors, and shareholders. And smaller verdicts can 
precipitate costly changes in businesses’ policies, internal precau-
tionary measures, or insurance premiums that ultimately result in 
higher prices for consumers—which may especially impact the poor 
and middle class. In public law cases, in which courts ensure that 
government bureaucracies act in accordance with statutory and con-
 211. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 212. Oldfather, supra note 32, at 131; see also Schwarzer, supra note 159, at 638 (“[A 
judge] cannot be indifferent to events which diminish the quality of justice in his court.”).  
 213. See, e.g., City of Yonkers v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251, 1256 (1988) (miscellane-
ous order) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refusing to stay civil 
contempt fines of $1 million daily against a city whose council refused to follow the district 
court’s order to pass an ordinance allowing the construction of public housing).  
 214. United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-29 (1994) (explaining that 
criminal contempt can lead to punitive fines or imprisonment).  
 215. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 159, at 979.  
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stitutional restrictions, the impact on third parties is likely to be 
even broader.216 Because so many people stand to be directly and in-
directly impacted by court rulings, there is a strong public interest in 
avoiding errors.      
 Furthermore, having courts focus on the substantive accuracy of 
their rulings and judgments, rather than simply addressing the par-
ticular issues or arguments litigants decide to raise, would bolster 
their institutional legitimacy.217 The public is much more likely to 
support and abide by the decisions of a judiciary that is committed to 
resolving disputes accurately and in accordance with the applicable 
law than one that does not place a premium on issuing substantively 
correct rulings. People reasonably may question the efficacy or legit-
imacy of courts if they are perceived as being indifferent to achieving 
accuracy and substantive justice, and instead are willing to adjudi-
cate cases based on parties’ potentially inadvertent waivers of win-
ning claims, issues, or arguments.218 
 An accuracy-centric approach to adjudication also allows courts to 
minimize the unnecessarily harmful and undesirable adverse conse-
quences of known, recurring, systemic deficiencies in the adversarial 
system. The adversarial system is not an inherent good, but rather a 
means to the end of achieving justice.219 It is based primarily on the 
assumption that a clash between relatively equally matched adver-
saries will lead to the most accurate result, because they each will 
vigorously promote their client’s interests while identifying deficien-
cies in their opponent’s arguments.220 The quality of lawyering in a 
case, however, often is “uneven.”221 Moreover, litigation has grown to 
be time-consuming and expensive.222 One side often will be able to 
have its attorneys devote a substantially greater amount of time re-
searching legal issues, developing arguments, and perfecting its 
briefs than the other. In cases such as these, “the court is provided 
with lopsided information, which often leads to skewed results.”223 
 Even when litigants are evenly matched in terms of counsel and 
resources, attorneys sometimes overlook issues and arguments.224 
And institutional litigants often have strategic reasons for avoiding 
 216. See Chayes, supra note 205, at 1294; Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 145, at 43. 
 217. See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 159, at 982-84; Cole, supra note 208, at 1225-26.  
 218. Cole, supra note 206, at 1225-26 (arguing that the courts’ institutional integrity is 
harmed if their adjudicatory process “mak[es] it appear that courts exist to serve the 
whims of litigants and make decisions without regard to legal precedent”).  
 219. See Schwarzer, supra note 159, at 638.  
 220. Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 273; Schwarzer, supra note 159, at 637.  
 221. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 159, at 986-87.  
 222. Schwarzer, supra note 159, at 635.  
 223. Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 159, at 986.  
 224. See Cravens, supra note 2, at 252-53.  
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certain issues or refusing to make certain arguments that may bene-
fit them in a particular case but be against their long-term or broader 
interests.225 Thus, while there may be compelling reasons to rely on 
litigants to bring cases to a court’s attention and shape their general 
contours,226 a purely adversarial process consistently can be expected 
to generate results that deviate from those otherwise required by the 
applicable law. When the adversarial system does not work as de-
signed to present a court with the full range of pertinent issues and 
arguments in a case, and the court identifies potential issues or con-
cerns on its own about the matter, the fundamental underlying goals 
that the adversarial system is intended to achieve would be furthered 
by allowing the court to invite the litigants to address them.    
 This Article’s recommended approach to adjudication also would 
further the policy goals underlying most statutes and common-law 
causes of action. Parties who implicitly or explicitly attempt to liti-
gate a case or issues within a case based on incorrect or incomplete 
legal premises effectively are attempting to have the court resolve 
the matter based on their own law (or their subjective understanding 
or interpretation of the law), rather than through accurate applica-
tion of the laws that purportedly govern the matter.227 When statutes 
or the common law create rights, whether against the Government or 
a private party, the policies underlying those rights often will be frus-
trated when people satisfying the legally established criteria are pre-
vented from engaging in the ostensibly permitted conduct or receiv-
ing the contemplated entitlement. Likewise, when a law allows a 
person to seek injunctive relief to stop certain conduct from occur-
ring, the harms that the statute was intended to prevent by prohibit-
ing that conduct will occur if a plaintiff who satisfies the statutory 
criteria is nevertheless unable to obtain an injunction.   
 Courts already have broad discretion to direct litigants to address 
legal issues, including non-jurisdictional ones, and to resolve motions 
and cases based on arguments the parties themselves did not raise.228 
They also have the institutional capacity to identify and give litigants 
 225. See Frost, supra note 49, at 479; see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come 
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98-99 
(1974) (explaining that large institutions which litigate frequently can look beyond the 
outcome of a particular case and develop their litigation strategies with an eye toward 
obtaining favorable rulings and precedents that will benefit them over the long term). 
 226. See Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
949, 960 (1978) (“Appointment as a federal judge does not, to use the classic phrase, confer 
‘a roving commission to do good.’ ”).  
 227. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g (1971) (providing 
that a court may not abide by litigants’ decision to apply the law of a particular jurisdiction 
if doing so would frustrate a “substantial policy” of some other jurisdiction that has a 
greater connection to the dispute).  
 228. See supra Part II.C–D.  
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the opportunity to address such issues fairly easily. Whereas courts 
generally lack access to the witnesses and evidence necessary to     
determine the underlying facts of a case, they can readily access    
the case law, statutes, regulations, legislative history, and other au-
thorities they need to identify potential legal issues or arguments 
and resolve questions of law accurately. Adopting an accuracy-centric 
approach to adjudication would legitimize and systemize a practice 
that currently occurs sporadically, unpredictably, and typically   
without explanation.229   
 Many scholars have argued that judges have a responsibility to go 
beyond the parties’ arguments to ensure the accuracy of their rulings 
only in certain types of cases. Professors Owen Fiss,230 Abram 
Chayes,231 and Melvin Aron Eisenberg,232 for example, have argued 
that courts must play an active role in public law cases to ensure the 
accuracy of their rulings. Professor Robert J. Pushaw makes a relat-
ed argument, emphasizing the difference between “cases” and “con-
troversies” within Article III’s enumeration of the types of disputes 
over which federal courts may exercise jurisdiction.233 In a dispute 
that qualifies as a “case,” the court’s primary role is “to answer the 
legal question presented through ‘exposition’—the process of ascer-
taining, applying, and interpreting the law,” regardless of the parties’ 
specific arguments.234 In a “controversy,” by contrast, the judge 
“serve[s] principally as a neutral umpire whose decision bound only 
the immediate parties.”235 Under Professor Pushaw’s approach, a 
court’s obligation and ability to ensure the accuracy of its rulings de-
pends on the jurisdictional font under which the matter was brought. 
Professor Amanda Frost, offering a slightly different perspective, ar-
gues that courts should raise new issues when necessary to prevent 
“erroneous statements of precedent-setting law,” “maintain control 
over interpretive methods,” or “give voice to legislative enactments 
disfavored or ignored by the parties.”236  
 While all of these scholars make persuasive points, their views     
of the importance of accuracy in judicial decisionmaking may be      
too narrow and rooted too deeply in the importance of the judiciary’s 
 229. See supra note 49. 
 230. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 145, at 24.  
 231. Chayes, supra note 205, at 1302.  
 232. Eisenberg, supra note 202, at 426-28 (supporting an exception to the norm of 
“strong responsiveness” to litigants’ arguments for public law cases).  
 233. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual 
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 (1994).  
 234. Id. at 449; see also id. at 473-74.  
 235. Id. at 450.  
 236. Frost, supra note 49, at 509.  
                                                                                                                  
2014]  AVOIDING ADVERSARIAL ADJUDICATION 333 
 
role in interpreting the Constitution and federal laws.237 As this Sec-
tion demonstrates, there are numerous other justifications for allow-
ing courts to go beyond the precise issues and arguments that liti-
gants raise in order to ensure that legal questions are answered 
properly and cases adjudicated in accordance with the underlying 
substantive law. Even when courts are playing a primarily dispute-
resolution function, litigants, the public, and the judiciary itself all 
have strong interests in maximizing the accuracy of courts’ rulings 
and cases’ outcomes.     
C.   Accuracy on Appeal 
 The preceding discussion focused primarily on trial courts, but 
most of the justifications for adopting an accuracy-centric approach 
to adjudication apply equally (if not more so) to appellate courts. Ap-
pellate courts are subject to different institutional constraints than 
trial courts, however, that warrant modifications to the way in which 
this Article’s recommendations should be applied.  
 An accuracy-centric approach is more likely to lead to potentially 
wasteful duplication of judicial effort in an appellate court than at 
the trial level. A trial court often will identify a claim, issue, or ar-
gument that the parties have overlooked before adjudicating a par-
ticular motion, resolving an issue, or fully trying the case. Bringing 
the matter to the litigants’ attention and giving them the opportunity 
to address it under such circumstances generally does not result in 
wasted judicial effort. By the time a case is on appeal, however, the 
parties typically have been through lengthy proceedings at the trial 
level, except for certain interlocutory appeals such as those concern-
ing class certification238 and preliminary injunctions.239 Raising a new 
issue or argument for the first time on appeal could lead to a reversal 
on grounds that the parties did not bring to the trial court’s attention 
and require the trial court to duplicate its efforts.240 Conversely, 
when a new issue or argument leads an appellate court to reject a 
plaintiff’s claims, the trial-level proceedings might have been brought 
to a speedier conclusion if the issue or argument had been raised there.   
 Furthermore, when additional evidence is necessary to satisfy the 
applicable legal standard or would help to elucidate an issue, liti-
gants easily can introduce it before a trial court. Appellate courts 
 237. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.  
 238. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  
 239. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012). 
 240. See Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality 
and Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1521, 1565-66 (2012); Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in 
Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985, 986-87 (1989).  
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generally are not equipped to accept new evidence, particularly for 
adjudicative, as opposed to legislative, facts. Remanding a case for a 
new hearing or trial to allow the litigants to expand the record to   
include the pertinent evidence would result in duplicative, time-
consuming proceedings.     
 Many of these concerns can be avoided by requiring courts to 
adopt an accuracy-centric approach to adjudication that is consistent 
with the institutional constraints that apply to their position within 
the judicial hierarchy. Concerns about wasted judicial effort and ap-
pellate courts’ inability to consider new evidence appear to be at their 
nadir regarding pure questions of law, particularly questions that 
would not require further proceedings in the lower court. Examples 
include arguments that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, a par-
ty’s evidence is legally insufficient to support its claims, a legal provi-
sion is unconstitutional, a certain statute does not give rise to a cause 
of action, or a particular cause of action does not allow for the award 
of certain kinds of relief (such as punitive damages, injunction, resti-
tution, or specific performance). Allowing appellate courts generally 
to consider such issues in the first instance, or new arguments relat-
ing to such issues, would yield the benefits of an accuracy-centric ap-
proach to adjudication discussed above241 without requiring the in-
troduction of new evidence or leading to duplicative trial-court pro-
ceedings, regardless of how the appellate court resolves the issue.  
 Professor Richard Campbell cautions that encouraging appellate 
courts to address new issues or arguments would encourage appeals 
and give attorneys “an incentive to conceal errors during the trial in 
order that they might use them as grounds for a reversal on review, 
in case a decision below was adverse.”242 Although such gamesman-
ship occasionally might happen, it seems that litigants most often 
seek to raise new issues or arguments on appeal because their trial 
counsel inadvertently overlooked them.243 Most attorneys would be 
reluctant to surrender knowingly a “free bite at the apple” by forego-
ing the chance to raise an issue before the trial court, especially 
where the ruling might shape the course of the rest of the case or im-
pact settlement negotiations.  
 Finally, to obtain a reversal on appeal, an attorney would have to 
show not only that an error occurred, but that it was prejudicial. Be-
cause many appellate courts are quick to dismiss errors as “harm-
less,” it would be very risky for an attorney to game the system by 
attempting to sandbag opponents on appeal. In any event, if a court 
 241. See supra Part IV.B.  
 242. Campbell, supra note 209, at 92-93.   
 243. Dennerline, supra note 240, at 989 (“[A]n attorney who does not know of an issue 
at trial cannot be encouraged by any rule to raise it.”).  
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determines that it would be inequitable to consider a new issue or 
argument, it would retain discretion to refuse to do so. The main 
function of an accuracy-centric approach would be to switch the 
strong presumption against consideration of new issues and claims in 
the first instance to a presumption in favor of it, at least where they 
would not require new evidence to resolve or the unnecessary dupli-
cation of trial-court proceedings. 
V.   OBJECTIONS TO AN ACCURACY-CENTRIC MODEL 
 At least four major objections may be raised against this Article’s 
conclusion that courts should ensure that their rulings and judg-
ments are substantively accurate, despite litigants’ deliberate or in-
advertent attempts to avoid adversarial adjudication of particular 
issues or arguments. Section A explains that courts should not be re-
luctant to ensure the substantive accuracy of their rulings based on 
concerns about evolving into an inquisitorial justice system. Section 
B shows that courts are institutionally equipped to reach accurate 
conclusions concerning claims, issues, and arguments, even if a liti-
gant is not the one initially to raise them. Section C demonstrates 
that this Article’s recommendations would not require courts to sacri-
fice their impartiality, while Section D shows that an accuracy-
centric approach would not unduly delay judicial proceedings. 
A.   Avoiding Inquisitorial Adjudication 
 One major objection to allowing or requiring courts to consider 
non-jurisdictional issues sua sponte is that it would turn the adver-
sarial system into an inquisitorial one.244 Professor David Alan 
Sklansky’s observations about criminal procedure are true for all liti-
gation—“A lengthy tradition in American law looks to the Continen-
tal, inquisitorial system of . . . adjudication for negative guidance 
about our own ideals. Avoiding inquisitorialism is taken to be a core 
commitment of our legal heritage.”245  
 244. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“In our adversary system, in 
both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of 
party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and as-
sign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”); see also United 
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“The rule that points not 
argued will not be considered . . . distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the 
inquisitorial one.”); Jeffrey C. Metzcar, Note, Raising the Defense of Procedural Default Sua 
Sponte: Who Will Enforce the Great Writ of Liberty?, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 907 
(2000). Of course, what constitutes an “inquisitorial” system varies from country to country 
and from time period to time period. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1681 (2009).  
 245. Sklansky, supra note 244, at 1636; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
62 (2004) (noting that an inquisitorial approach is “wholly foreign” to American practice); 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (“[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquis-
itorial system . . . .”); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report 
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 “The central characteristic of the inquisitorial model is the active 
role of the judge, who is given the principal responsibility for search-
ing out the relevant facts. . . . [T]he evidence is developed in a pre-
dominantly unilateral fashion by the judge, and the lawyers’ role is 
minimal.”246 Justice Scalia contends, “What makes a system adver-
sarial rather than inquisitorial” is that the judge “decides on the ba-
sis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”247 An 
inquisitorial system “allows the fact-finder free rein to follow all 
trails.”248 The American legal tradition regards inquisitorial systems 
as less accurate than an adversarial system, and many commentators 
contend that inquisitorial systems show less regard for litigants’ au-
tonomy and dignitary interests.249 
 Simply dismissing a certain practice as “inquisitorial” does not 
seem a sufficient basis for rejecting it. Courts already are required to 
engage in purportedly inquisitorial analysis under certain circum-
stances, such as when they confirm sua sponte their subject-matter 
jurisdiction250 or assess the propriety of granting a default or unop-
posed motion for summary judgment.251 Requiring courts to go fur-
ther and apply an accuracy-centric approach to adjudication would 
leave the justice system fundamentally party-driven. Courts still 
would wait for parties to initiate proceedings and rely on the litigants 
to identify the contours of the case (i.e., the nucleus of operative facts 
that defines the dispute252). Under an accuracy-centric approach, 
when a court identifies potential new claims, issues, or arguments, it 
would give the parties an opportunity to address them, rather than 
unilaterally attempting to determine the proper resolution for itself. 
The fundamental structure of the adversary system would remain 
largely undisturbed. The desirability of having courts confirm for 
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958) [hereinafter Joint Conference      
Report]. 
 246. Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 
57, 74 (1998); see also Hartmann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that the American legal system, unlike a European inquisitorial system, “is not 
geared to having judges take over the function of lawyers, even when the result would be to 
rescue clients from their lawyers’ mistakes”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 374, 381-82 (1982) (pointing out that our system is adversarial rather than inquisi-
torial because “[p]arties, rather than officers of the state, control[] case preparation” and 
“its basic principle is that the parties, not the judge, have the major responsibility for and 
control over the definition of the dispute”). 
 247. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).  
 248. Peter Brett, Legal Decisionmaking and Bias: A Critique of an “Experiment,” 45 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 22 (1973).  
 249. Frost, supra note 49, at 459; Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 282.  
 250. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012).  
 251. See supra Part II.A–B.  
 252. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).  
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themselves the accuracy of parties’ legal assertions therefore should 
turn on considerations other than generic fears of inquisition.  
B.   Accuracy in the Absence of Adverseness 
 A closely related objection is that the absence of adversarial adju-
dication will hinder courts’ attempts to resolve legal issues correct-
ly.253 Many argue that the adversary process is a necessary safeguard 
to ensure courts achieve accurate results. “Through vigorous advoca-
cy each party helps the court to perceive and to respond properly      
to weaknesses in the presentations made by the other parties. In ad-
dition, vigorous advocacy can illuminate facets of a case that are    
not immediately apparent and might not otherwise be considered    
by the court.”254 The adversary system takes advantage of “the incen-
tive of the contesting parties to search out relevant facts, policies, 
and authorities.”255  
 Of course, it has long been recognized that adversarial adjudica-
tion “provides no guarantee that all pertinent arguments or theories 
will be presented to the court. One or more of the omitted theories 
may be in some way better for the resolution of the case than those 
the parties have put forward.”256 As Owen Fiss points out, disparities 
in resources and incentives can greatly affect a party’s ability to pre-
sent its case persuasively.257 Thus, while adversarial presentation 
should remain a crucial cornerstone of the justice system, preventing 
courts from adjusting for its shortcomings seems unnecessarily harsh 
and dogmatic.258 A court may promote the adversarial system’s pur-
ported goal of achieving accurate outcomes by ensuring that a case 
and the issues within it are decided in accordance with applicable 
 253. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition regards 
the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of 
error . . . .”); Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 259-62 (discussing Poyner v. Loftus, 694 A.2d 
69 (D.C. 1997), in which the court adjudicated an issue sua sponte and arrived at an out-
come that was directly contrary to a squarely applicable statute); Freedman, supra note 
246, at 73 (“[T]he adversary system is the method of dispute resolution that is most effec-
tive in determining truth . . . .”).  
 254. Spann, supra note 159, at 650. 
 255. Freedman, supra note 246, at 85. It also has been argued that the adversarial 
model shows greater respect for litigants, Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 282 & n.205 
(citing STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN AP-
PROACH TO ADJUDICATION 35 (1988)), and makes it more likely they will accept the out-
come of a case, see, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 113-15 (1975); see also Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 284-85.  
 256. Cravens, supra note 2, at 253; see also Sklansky, supra note 244, at 1687 (noting 
that there are “notorious gaps between an idealized version of the American adversary 
system and the system’s actual, day-to-day operation”).  
 257. Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 144, at 1076-77; see also Fiss, Forms of Jus-
tice, supra note 145, at 24. 
 258. See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text. 
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law, even when a litigant overlooks an applicable legal provision, ar-
gument, precedent, or claim.  
C.   Preserving Impartiality 
 One of Lon Fuller’s main reasons for arguing that adverseness is 
critical to adjudication is that allowing judges to conduct their own 
legal inquiries, independent of the parties’ arguments, encourages 
them to jump to conclusions and biases them in favor of one side.259   
A joint report of the American Bar Association and Association of 
American Law Schools on the adversarial process, echoing this sen-
timent, states that identifying possible issues and arguments re-
quires an arbiter to “put aside his neutrality.”260 When it comes time 
to adjudicate such issues, the arbiter often is unable “to look with 
skepticism on the fruits of his efforts” and cannot “return[] to his 
neutral position.”261 The report elaborates that “what starts as a pre-
liminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry tends, quickly and 
imperceptibly, to become a fixed conclusion, as all that confirms the 
diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the mind, while all that runs 
counter to it is received with diverted attention.”262  
 Professor Freedman, also concurring with this critique, warns 
that when a judge engages in her own legal inquiries, it allows her 
“to ignore all trails but the one that initially appears to be the most 
promising . . . without the corrective benefit of investigation and 
presentation of evidence by active adversaries.”263 Judith Resnik 
raised many of these same concerns about the increasing managerial 
role that the rules of procedure require judges to play in civil litiga-
tion.264 She contends, “Having supervised case preparation and 
pressed for settlement, judges can hardly be considered untainted if 
they are ultimately asked to find the facts and adjudicate the merits 
of a dispute.”265 
 Such concerns seem overblown. As an initial matter, they arise 
from psychological assumptions rather than any empirical evidence. 
 259. Fuller, supra note 203, at 385-86; see also Freedman, supra note 246, at 85 (“[T]he 
adversary system is superior, because it mitigates the decisionmaker’s tendency to judge 
prematurely . . . .”).  
 260. Joint Conference Report, supra note 245, at 1160.   
 261. Milani & Smith, supra note 5, at 274 (citing Joint Conference Report, supra note 
245).  
 262. Joint Conference Report, supra note 245, at 1160.  
 263. Freedman, supra note 246, at 75.  
 264. Resnik, supra note 246, at 380 (arguing that “[m]anagement is a new form of ‘judi-
cial activism’ ”); see also id. at 414 (arguing that active judicial management of pretrial 
proceedings “breaks sharply from American norms of adjudication” in large part because it 
is “judge initiated”).  
 265. Id. at 430 (footnote omitted).  
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Moreover, attorneys are trained to engage in “objective,” self-directed 
research in order to find the “correct” legal answers, or at least      
determine how a court of competent jurisdiction (or the pertinent ap-
pellate court) would resolve a particular issue.266 Indeed, such objec-
tive and predictive writing is among the first things that law stu-
dents learn and constitutes a major part of an attorney’s client-
counseling function.  
 It is unclear why a court is more likely to be biased by its own re-
search into a potential issue or concern than if a litigant brings the 
issue to the court’s attention. Moreover, even if a litigant raises an 
issue, in many cases a court still will read the underlying cases for 
itself and perhaps perform supplemental research to identify further 
pertinent authorities that the litigants may have overlooked. The 
flexibility that the system already gives judges in adjudicating issues 
that the parties raise, as well as their broad discretion to consider 
issues beyond those that the parties contest,267 belies any real con-
cerns about judicial partiality.  
D.   Preventing Delay 
 The most persuasive concern about encouraging judges to identify 
sua sponte and adjudicate new legal issues and arguments is not 
rooted in fears about undermining the adversarial process, reducing 
accuracy, or promoting judicial bias, but rather the sheer burden of 
such duties. Requiring judges to consider only legal issues and argu-
ments that the parties expressly identify and adequately brief—as 
well as those narrow classes of issues properly classified as jurisdic-
tional or plain error—allows already overburdened courts to process 
cases more quickly. To a certain extent, the desirability of making 
further tradeoffs between speed and ultimate accuracy is a policy 
matter. Courts, however, can shift back onto litigants the burden of 
establishing their substantive entitlement to the relief they seek—
such as the granting of a motion, acceptance of a stipulation of law, 
or issuance of a consent decree—based on the underlying applicable 
law. The marginal time commitment for a court of adopting an accu-
racy-centric approach to adjudication therefore may not be as sub-
stantial as it might initially appear.  
 Moreover, even in an era of substantial judicial delays and      
backlogs, imposing on judges the duty to make sure that their sub-
stantive orders, rulings, and judgments are legally correct seems   
reasonable. If parties find the delay intolerable and would rather re-
solve their dispute on terms that may be, or are, legally incorrect, 
they generally remain free to do so through private settlements or 
 266. Cf. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457-58 (1897).  
 267. See supra Part II.C–D.  
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arbitration.268 There is little need to place a court’s imprimatur on 
such alegal outcomes.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 There are many procedural vehicles through which parties ex-
pressly or implicitly may seek to have a court enter a substantive rul-
ing, order, or judgment without fully considering the merits of the 
underlying case or particular issues within the case. Because all       
of these procedural vehicles ultimately implicate the same underly-
ing issue—the extent to which a court may be indifferent about the 
legal accuracy of its rulings—a single, uniform standard should apply 
to all of them. Although Article III’s prohibition on hypothetical    
lawsuits imposes outer limits on a court’s ability to base a judgment 
on patently incorrect legal premises, courts should go well beyond 
that absolute minimum by adopting an accuracy-centric approach     
to adjudication.  
 A court should not issue a ruling, grant a motion, or award a 
judgment if it harbors doubts about the validity of the requesting 
party’s legal premises or otherwise believes that such relief would be 
inconsistent with the applicable underlying law. If the litigants have 
failed to address a potentially valid claim, issue, or argument, the 
court should direct them to do so. If litigants wish to resolve their 
differences based on incorrect or unexamined legal standards, they 
remain free to do so through private arbitration or settlement agree-
ments, rather than putting courts in the position of placing a judicial 
imprimatur on rulings or judgments that are not based on their best 
understanding of the law.  
 
 268. See supra Part III.  
                                                                                                                  
